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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit issued several decisions that had a significant impact on patent
law. In a major win for patent owners, the Supreme Court’s ruling in
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.1 created the potential for
dramatic increases in damages awards, when it held that patent owners
can recover lost profits from foreign use of an invention.2 The fate of
invalidation proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB) at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) hung in the
balance in 2018. In Oil States Energy Services LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group,
LLC,3 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the PTAB
inter partes review (IPR) proceedings.4 In a case decided on the same
day, SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu,5 the PTAB’s partial institution practice was
This case fundamentally
struck down by the Supreme Court.6
transformed strategy for both petitioners and patent owners at the PTAB.
The Federal Circuit maintained a large patent docket in 2018 with
over half of its opinions issuing on appeals from the PTAB. Many of
the cases decided in 2018 involved novel legal questions regarding
venue, tribal sovereign immunity in PTAB cases, the statutory
interpretation of the one-year bar in IPR proceedings, apportionment
of damages, Article III standing to appeal adverse PTAB decisions, and
continued to address the question of patent eligibility. This Article
collects and summarizes the Federal Circuit’s 2018 patent decisions
and analyzes their impact.
I. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Claim construction remained a popular issue presented in Federal
Circuit appeals in 2018 because claim construction gets a de novo
review at the Federal Circuit. Most cases followed the standard
framework articulated in Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America
LLC7 and addressed common disputes such as incorporating
1. 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018).
2. Id. at 2139.
3. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
4. Id. at 1379.
5. 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
6. Id. at 1358.
7. 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The words of a claim are generally given
their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in
the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.”); see also
Blackbird Tech LLC v. ELB Elecs., Inc., 895 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (vacating
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limitations from the specification into the claims and the use of plain
and ordinary meaning.8 For PTAB appeals, claim construction was
again a common theme in the cases that the Federal Circuit remanded
or reversed.9 This Section highlights a few of the interesting claim
construction decisions from 2018.
The most notable claim construction cases in 2018 dealt with
collateral estoppel effect of prior judicial constructions. In Knowles
Electronics LLC v. Cirrus Logic, Inc.,10 an appeal from the decision of
PTAB in a reexamination proceeding, the Federal Circuit determined
that the PTAB properly considered extrinsic evidence in its claim
construction analysis because the intrinsic evidence was not definitive
as to the meaning of the term “package.”11 More importantly, the
Federal Circuit addressed the interplay between the construction of
the same term in a 2011 Federal Circuit case and the PTAB’s
construction in the reexamination.12 The Federal Circuit rejected
Knowles’s argument that the PTAB erred by failing to evaluate the
Federal Circuit’s claim construction during its claim construction
the district court’s claim construction requiring the attachment surface be secured to
the ballast cover where plain language of the claim did not require such an attachment
and embodiments in the specification describing this attachment mechanism were
exemplary); Sumitomo Dainippon Pharma Co. v. Emcure Pharm. Ltd., 887 F.3d 1153,
1154, 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming the district court’s claim construction in
a Hatch-Waxman case because the plain language of the claim covered what was
depicted in the claim, the (–)-enantiomer).
8. See Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’Real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming PTAB’s claim construction that comported with claim’s
plain language read in light of the specification); Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision
Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming PTAB’s claim construction
because proposed construction impermissibly sought to import limitations from
specification into claims); Steuben Foods, Inc. v. Nestle USA, Inc., 884 F.3d 1352,
1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming PTAB’s construction); Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic
Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (same).
9. See TF3 Ltd. v. Tre Milano, LLC, 894 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(holding the PTAB’s construction unreasonably broad where its construction
expanded the claims beyond what was disclosed in the specification); In re Power
Integrations, Inc., 884 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding the PTAB’s
construction of “coupled’ unreasonably broad because it would make every element
in a circuit “coupled” to every other element rendering phrases in the claim
meaningless); In re Hodges, 882 F.3d 1107, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting the PTAB’s
construction of “signal” as “an act, event, or the like that causes or incites some action”
unreasonably broad).
10. 883 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
11. Id. at 1363–64.
12. Id. at 1364–65 (citing MEMS Tech. Berhad v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 447 F.
App’x 142 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
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analysis and found that the PTAB’s construction was consistent with
the prior judicial construction, and thus proper.13 Judge Newman
dissented, arguing that “consistency” was the wrong inquiry.14 Rather,
Judge Newman asserted “[t]he question is whether the PTAB decision
is precluded by the prior judicial decision, and whether any equitable
or due process exception to preclusion may apply.”15 In this case,
because preclusion applied, Judge Newman argued that the prior
Federal Circuit construction should have bound the PTAB.16
Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc.17 applied collateral estoppel
based on a prior Federal Circuit claim construction of the same term
in a related patent.18 In an appeal of a different but related patent
owned by Steuben Foods, the Federal Circuit construed the term
“aseptic,” and relied on binding lexicography in the specification.19 In
this case, the claims at issue used the term “aseptic” in a similar fashion.20
Because neither party identified any material difference between the
two patents or their prosecution histories that would give rise to claim
construction issues, the court vacated the PTAB’s construction and
construed “aseptic” to have the same meaning as the prior appeal.21
The Federal Circuit also addressed the issue of claim language
sufficient to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).22 In Zeroclick, LLC v. Apple Inc.,23
the Federal Circuit considered whether the use of “program” and “user
interface code” in a claim element invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.24 The
Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in construing the
limitations “program that can operate the movement of the pointer
(0)” and “user interface code being configured to detect one or more
locations touched by a movement of the user’s finger on the screen

13. Id.
14. Id. at 1372 (Newman, J., dissenting).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1373.
17. 884 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
18. Id. at 1351.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1352.
22. Section 112(f) specifies that an “element in a claim for a combination may be
expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).
23. 891 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
24. Id. at 1006–07.
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without requiring the exertion of pressure and determine therefrom a
selected operation” as means-plus-function claims.25 The failure to use
the word “means” in these limitations created the rebuttable
presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.26 To overcome the
presumption, Apple was required to demonstrate that “the claim term
fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function
without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.”27
Because Apple failed to do so, it failed to rebut the presumption
against application of § 112, ¶ 6.28 The Federal Circuit found that the
district court, which relied on Apple’s arguments, “erred by effectively
treating “program” and “user interface code” as nonce words, which
can operate as substitutes for “means” and presumptively bring the
disputed claims limitations within the ambit of § 112, ¶ 6.”29
One of the most significant changes in claim construction was made
by rule, not case law. In 2018, the PTO enacted a rule that changed
the claim construction standard for all America Invents Act (AIA)
invalidity challenges that were filed on or after November 13, 2018.
The standard changed from the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard to the same standard used in district courts.30 Because the
claim construction rule change was not retroactive, the Federal Circuit
will be addressing claim construction disputes under the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard for years to come.
One interesting 2018 case, Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Google LLC,31
considered the role of prosecution history plays in a claim construction
determination using the broadest reasonable construction standard.32
In the final written decision, the PTAB presented alternative rulings on
claim construction—a primary ruling holding that no prosecution
history disclaimer occurred and an alternative ruling assuming
prosecution history disclaimer—and found the claims invalid under
each.33 The Federal Circuit determined that the PTAB erred in
declining to apply prosecution disclaimer in its primary ruling. It
reasoned that because the amended claim included a sufficient

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 1007.
Id. (quoting Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
Id. at 1007–08.
Id. at 1008.
37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100, 42.200, 42.300.
882 F.3d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1135–36.
Id.
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explanation for the changes and the examiner confirmed that
explanation, the amended claims met the requirements for prosecution
history disclaimer and were allowable.34
The interpretation of product-by-process claim language also took
center stage in 2018 in In re Nordt Development Co.,35 an appeal of the
PTAB’s affirmance of the examiner’s claim rejections.36 During
prosecution, the examiner found that the phrase “injection molded,”
recited throughout the claim, described a “method of manufacturing
an apparatus,” whereas the claim was an apparatus claim.37 The
examiner rejected the claims contending that “[i]n order to anticipate
the injection molded feature, the prior art must disclose the finished
product and not the method of making the product.”38 The PTAB
affirmed the finding that the applicant did not “persuasively explain
what structural limitation is imparted by this manufacturing
practice.”39 The Federal Circuit disagreed and found that the phrase
“injection molded” connotes structure and noted that the specification
describes injection molding as forming an integral component.40 The
court further noted that “words of limitation that can connote with
equal force a structural characteristic of the product or a process of
manufacture are commonly and by default interpreted in their
structural sense, unless the patentee has demonstrated otherwise.”41
The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s anticipatory rejection based
on an incorrect claim construction and remanded for the PTAB to
construe the term “injection molded.”42
II. VALIDITY
A. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
The Federal Circuit addressed nine § 101 cases in 2018. Section 101
provides that “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof” is

34. Id. at 1136.
35. 881 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
36. Id. at 1372.
37. Id. at 1374.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1375.
41. Id. at 1375–76 (citing 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350
F.3d 1365, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
42. Id. at 1376.
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patent-eligible if it meets the other statutory requirements.43 However,
this provision “contains an important implicit exception: [l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”44
In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,45 the Supreme Court set forth
a two-step framework for distinguishing a patent that claims laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.46 The first step requires
discerning “whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those
patent-ineligible concepts.”47 The first step is the search for an
“inventive concept” sufficient “to ensure that the claim amounts to
‘significantly more’ than the abstract idea itself.”48 If the claims are
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the court then considers the
“elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered
combination’ to determine whether the additional elements
‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”49
Many of the cases included dissents or concurrences expressing
concerns about the current state of patent eligibility jurisprudence.50
1.

Cases implicating the timing of subject matter eligibility challenges
Several Federal Circuit cases in 2018 made it more difficult for
defendants in a patent litigation to challenge subject matter eligibility
in the early stages of the litigation. For example, in Berkheimer v. HP
43. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
44. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
45. 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
46. Id. at 217.
47. Id.
48. Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18).
49. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77–79 (2012)).
50. See, e.g., In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (Mayer, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the Federal Circuit’s
temptation to assess underlying facts during the eligibility determination will topple
the current framework and stifle science and arts); Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL,
Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Plager, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (scrutinizing the process of finding abstract ideas for involving
redundant steps and an elusive search for inventiveness, and asking “[i]s it any wonder
that the results of this process are less than satisfactory”); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890
F.3d 1369, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (Lourie, J., concurring) (stating that
§ 101 “needs clarification by higher authority, perhaps by Congress” and opining that
“[t]he Supreme Court whittled away at the § 101 statute in Mayo by analyzing abstract
ideas and natural phenomena with a two-step test” that introduces aspects of §§ 102
and 103 into the eligibility analysis), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018).
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Inc.,51 the Federal Circuit held that “[w]hile patent eligibility is
ultimately a question of law, the district court erred in concluding
there are no underlying factual questions to the § 101 inquiry.”52 In
this case, the Federal Circuit considered whether a patentee waived his
ability to argue that the dependent claims are separately patent eligible
when the district court treated the sole asserted independent claim as
representative.53 Here, because the patentee did not agree to make
the independent claim 1 representative, and the district court
improperly treated the claim as representative because it was the sole
asserted independent claim, the Federal Circuit found that the
patentee did not waive its arguments regarding the dependent
claims.54 The court then turned to the two-step Alice test. In step one,
the Federal Circuit rejected the patentee’s argument that the claims
are not abstract because the parsing limitation of the claims “roots the
claims in technology and transforms the data structure from source
code to object code.”55 The court found that limiting the invention to
a technological environment does “not make an abstract concept any
less abstract under step one.”56 Regarding step two, the Federal Circuit
found that a subset of asserted claims contain limitations directed to
an arguably unconventional inventive concept.57 Because the step two
analysis involved a disputed question of fact, the district court’s
summary judgment of the invalidity of these claims was improper.58
Judge Lourie concurred, noting that “the law needs clarification by
higher authority, perhaps by Congress, to work its way out of what so
many in the innovation field consider are § 101 problems.”59
In Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,60 issued only a
week after Berkheimer, the Federal Circuit held that the district court
erred in finding the claims invalid under the § 101 at the Rule 12(b)(6)
stage of the litigation.61 The district court granted the defendant’s
51. 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018).
52. Id. at 1369.
53. Id. at 1365.
54. Id. at 1365–66.
55. Id. at 1367.
56. Id. (quoting Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d
1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
57. Id. at 1370.
58. Id.
59. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
(Lourie, J., concurring), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018).
60. 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018), reh’g denied, 890 F.3d 1354 (2015).
61. Id. at 1123.
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Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, holding the asserted claims invalid as
directed to ineligible subject matter.62 The Federal Circuit vacated,
finding that the district court erred to the extent that it held the claims
ineligible solely because it directed to an intangible embodiment.63
Because the representative claim constituted a system claim, the Federal
Circuit found that it fit within one of the four statutorily provided
categories of patent-eligible subject matter, unlike claims to pure data
and claims to transitory signals embedded with data.64 Writing
separately, Judge Reyna disagreed “with the majority’s broad statements
on the role of factual evidence in a § 101 inquiry,” stating that Federal
Circuit’s “precedent is clear that the § 101 inquiry is a legal question.”65
Next, Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Systems & Software LLC66 involved
issue preclusion at the Rule 12(b)(6) phase.67 Voter Verified,
previously sued Election Systems’ predecessors alleging infringement
of the patent asserted in the present case.68 The court in the prior case
entered summary judgment in favor of Voter Verified, concluding that
all claims except one were not invalid under § 101 because Election
Systems failed to present any arguments or evidence regarding the
invalidity of these claims.69 On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined
that the district court did not err in holding these claims were not
proven invalid.70 Over six years later, Voter Verified sued Election
Systems in a different venue, and Election Systems filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that all asserted
claims were invalid under § 101.71 Voter Verified argued that issue
preclusion prevents Election Systems from relitigating the § 101
issue.72 The district court granted the motion to dismiss and
concluded that Alice’s two-step analysis constituted “a substantial
change” in the law such that “the issue of patent validity is not
precluded from further litigation.”73

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 1125–26, 1130.
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1130 (Reyna, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
887 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 2019 WL 113159 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2019).
Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1380.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Federal Circuit first addressed the threshold issue of whether
Alice was “a substantial change” in the law such that issue preclusion
did not apply.74 The Federal Circuit concluded that Alice did not alter
the governing law of § 101 because the Supreme Court applied the
same two-step framework it created in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.75 in its § 101 analysis.76 The Federal Circuit
next considered the four required elements for issue preclusion under
the Eleventh Circuit’s test77 and determined that issue preclusion did not
apply here because the § 101 issue was not actually litigated in the first
district court action and was not necessary to the judgment in that case.78
Applying the two-step Alice framework, the Federal Circuit found
that the claims as a whole are drawn to the concept of voting, verifying
the vote, and submitting the vote for tabulation—fundamental
activities that have been performed by humans for hundreds of years,
and therefore are “nothing more than abstract ideas.”79 Because
neither party disputed that the claims recited the use of a general
purpose computer that carries out the abstract idea, the Federal
Circuit determined that there was no inventive concept sufficient to
transform the claims into patent-eligible subject matter.80
2.

Claims found eligible
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc.81 involved a software
innovation—“a method of providing computer security by scanning a
downloadable and attaching the results of that scan to the
downloadable itself in the form of a ‘security profile.’”82 For software
innovations, like the claims at issue in Finjan, the first inquiry often
74. Id. at 1381.
75. 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
76. Id. at 1382 (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)).
77. The Eleventh Circuit requires a showing of all of the following four elements
for issue preclusion to apply:
(1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one involved in the prior
litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior suit; (3)
the determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have been a critical
and necessary part of the judgment in that action; and (4) the party against
whom the earlier decision is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding.
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 327 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003).
78. Voter Verified, Inc., 887 F.3d at 1383–84.
79. Id. at 1385.
80. Id. at 1386.
81. 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
82. Id. at 1303.
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turns on whether the claims focus on “the specific asserted
improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that
qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely
as a tool.”83 The Federal Circuit found the claims to be directed to a
non-abstract improvement in computer functionality because the
claimed method “employs a new kind of file that enables a computer
security system to do things it could not do before.”84
Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc.85 also dealt with a
software invention and involved Alice’s step one analysis.86 The asserted
claims were directed to an improved user interface for computing devices,
particularly devices with small screens.87 Specifically, the majority found
that the invention improves efficiency by bringing together function and
commonly accessed data in a summary window without requiring the user
to open the application.88 Therefore, the asserted claims were not
directed to an abstract idea of an index, as argued by LG.89
Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International
Ltd.90 addressed the patent eligibility of method of treatment claims.91
The Federal Circuit held that the claims of the asserted patent were
patent eligible.92 When applying Alice step one, the Federal Circuit
rejected the West-Ward’s contention that similar claims were found to
be patent ineligible in Mayo, and Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc.93 The court noted that the claims in Mayo were not
directed to a novel method of treating a disease but instead, were
targeted at a diagnostic method based on the “relationships between
concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood
that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause
harm.”94 As such, Mayo’s claim as a whole was not directed to the

83. Id.
84. Id. at 1305.
85. 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
86. Id. at 1361–63.
87. Id. at 1362–63.
88. Id. at 1363.
89. Id. at 1362.
90. 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-817 (U.S. Dec. 27, 2018).
91. Id. at 1121.
92. Id. at 1136.
93. Id. at 1134–36 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 74–75 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576,
580 (2013)).
94. Id. at 1134 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
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application of a drug to a patient.95 Here, the claims were directed to
a specific method of treatment for specific patients using a specific
compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome and
therefore were different from Mayo.96 Further, unlike the claims in
Mayo, the asserted claims encompass more than the natural
relationship between compounds; instead, they recite a method of
treating patients based on this relationship.97 The court found that
Myriad did not compel a different result because “the asserted claims
fall squarely within categories of claims that the [Supreme] Court
stated were not implicated by its decision.”98 Chief Judge Prost
dissented and argued that the claims were directed to a law of nature,
and therefore were patent ineligible.99
3.

Claims found ineligible.
In SAP America, Inc. v. Investpic, LLC,100 another software invention
case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the
asserted claims were not patent-eligible.101 The asserted patent
described and claimed systems and methods for performing certain
statistical analyses of investment information.102 Applying the two-step
Alice framework, the Federal Circuit found that the asserted claims
were directed to abstract ideas; namely, selecting certain information,
analyzing it, using mathematical techniques, and reporting or
displaying the results of the analyses.103 The fact that the information
describes real investments did not change the analysis.104 Regarding
Alice step two, the Federal Circuit concluded that nothing in the claims
moved them from the class of a subject matter ineligible application to an
eligible application.105 Although some of the claims required hardware

95. Id.
96. Id. at 1136.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576,
595–96 (2013) (disclaiming that the Supreme Court’s holding does not implicate
method claims, applications of knowledge about genes, or the alteration of naturally
occurring genetic code).
99. Vanda Pharm. Inc., 887 F.3d at 1140 (Prost, C.J., dissenting).
100. 898 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
101. Id. at 1163.
102. Id. at 1163–64.
103. Id. at 1167.
104. Id. at 1168.
105. Id.
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components, these limitations required no improved computer resources
and in fact, are already available computers would suffice for the claims.106
The Federal Circuit in Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,107 affirmed
the district court’s determination that the asserted claims directed to
the operation of an “attention manager” that provides information to
a computer user without interfering with the user’s primary activity
failed to recite patent-eligible subject matter.108 Applying the abstract
idea step of the two-step Alice framework, the majority found that the
recited claims were directed to an abstract idea because “they consist
of generic and conventional information acquisition and organization
steps that are connected to, but do not convert, the abstract idea—
displaying a second set of data without interfering with a first set of
data—into a particular conception of how to carry out that concept.”109
Turning to Alice step two, the majority found that nothing in the claim
converted the abstract idea into an inventive concept.110 Judge Plager
wrote separately to “concur in the carefully reasoned opinion” by the
majority based on the current state of the law and to “dissent from our
court’s continued application of this incoherent body of doctrine.”111
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment that all of the asserted patent claims were ineligible under
§ 101 in BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc.112 The asserted patents are
directed to a “self-evolving generic index” for organizing information
stored in a database.113 Under step one of the Alice framework, the
Federal Circuit “agree[d] with the district court that the asserted
claims are directed to the abstract idea of considering historical usage
information while inputting data.”114 The Federal Circuit rejected the
patent owner’s argument that the claims could not be directed to
abstract ideas because their limitations were not satisfied by a generic
computer.115 In this case, the database structure provided a generic
environment in which the claimed method is performed, and thus, the
recitation of a database structure slightly more detailed than a generic

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1169–70.
896 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1346.
Id.
Id. at 1348 (Plager, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
899 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1286–87.
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database did not save the asserted claims at step one.116 The Federal
Circuit also found that the alleged benefits raised by the patent owner
were not improvements to database functionality, but instead were
benefits that flow from performing an abstract idea with a well-known
database structure.117 Under step two of Alice, the Federal Circuit
agreed with the district court that the asserted claims lacked an
inventive concept.118 The court noted that “[i]f a claim’s only
‘inventive concept’ is the application of an abstract idea using
conventional and well-understood techniques, the claim has not been
transformed into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea.”119
In this case, the Federal Circuit found that the only alleged
unconventional feature was the requirement that users are guided by
summary comparison usage information or relative historical usage
information which is the abstract idea.120
In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V.121 dealt with subject matter
eligibility in the patent examination context.122 The claims at issue
were directed to rules for playing a dice game and specifically, the
markings (or lack thereof) on the dice.123 The examiner rejected the
claims as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101
and the PTAB affirmed.124 Under Alice step one, the Federal Circuit
agreed with the PTAB that the claims were directed to the abstract idea
of “rules for playing a dice game.”125 The court found no error in the
PTAB’s use of a more refined characterization of the claimed abstract
idea as a means of acknowledging one method of organizing human
activity.126 The Federal Circuit rejected the applicant’s argument that
the claimed dice have markings on one, two, or three die faces and
were therefore not conventional.127 The court found that the printed
indicia on each die did not functionally relate to the substrate of the
die, and therefore the markings constituted printed matter.128 Because
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1290–91.
Id. at 1291.
911 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1158–59.
Id. at 1159.
Id.
Id. at 1160–61.
Id.
Id. at 1161.
Id.
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the printed matter, to which § 101 is inapplicable, constituted the only
disputably unconventional aspect of the recited method of playing a
dice game, the Federal Circuit held that “the rejected claims do not
recite an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed
subject matter into a patent-eligible application of the abstract idea.”129
Judge Mayer wrote separately in concurrence and argued that “claims
directed to dice, card, and board games can never meet the [§ ] 101
threshold because they endeavor to influence human behavior rather
than effect technological change.”130 Judge Mayer also disagreed with
the court’s statement that patent eligibility inquiry “may contain
underlying issues of fact,” and stated that “subject matter eligibility
under . . . § 101 is a pure question of law, one that can, and should, be
resolved at the earliest stages of litigation.”131
B. Anticipation
The Federal Circuit addressed anticipation in several contexts in
2018. In Monsanto Technology LLC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,132
the Federal Circuit considered inherent anticipation.133 At issue in
Monsanto was the extent to which extrinsic evidence, specifically expert
declarations, may be used to support what is “necessarily present” in a
prior art reference’s teaching.134 Noting that “[i]t is well established
that such reliance on extrinsic evidence is proper in an inherency
analysis,”135 the Federal Circuit concluded that the expert declarations
did not expand the meaning of the prior art reference or serve as prior
art; they demonstrated what is inherent in the prior art reference.136
The Federal Circuit therefore held that substantial evidence supported
the PTAB’s finding that the applied reference inherently anticipated a
disputed limitation of the challenged claims.137

129. Id. at 1162.
130. Id. at 1162 (Mayer, J., concurring).
131. Id.
132. 878 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
133. Inherent Anticipation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An invention’s
lack of novelty arising from the existence of prior-art products or processes that
necessarily possess the same characteristics. Inherency differs from obviousness in that
a lack of novelty must be based on fact, not mere possibility or probability.”).
134. Monsanto Tech. LLC, 878 F.3d at 1345.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1346.
137. Id. at 1347–48.
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In Core Wireless S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,138 the jury found the
asserted claims remained valid, even though the plaintiff chose not to
present any affirmative evidence to rebut the defendant’s prima facie
case of anticipation.139 The accused infringer, LG, argued that because
the plaintiff failed to present affirmative evidence in rebuttal, it was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the applied reference
anticipated the claims.140 The Federal Circuit disagreed and affirmed
the denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law,
finding that the jury was entitled to evaluate the testimony of the
defendant’s expert and determine whether defendant clearly and
convincingly established that the reference anticipated the claims.141
The Federal Circuit noted that “granting judgment as a matter of law
for the party carrying the burden of proof is generally ‘reserved for
extreme cases,’” and this case did not rise to that level.142
Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc.143 involved application of the on-sale
bar.144 A patent is invalid under the on-sale bar if, before the critical
date, the product is the subject of a commercial offer for sale and the
invention is ready for patenting.145 The asserted patents in Medicines
Co. covered an improved process for manufacturing a drug product of
bivalirudin, marketed by Medicines Co. under the brand name
Angiomax.146 On February 27, 2007, Medicines Co. entered into a
distribution agreement stating that Medicines Co. desired “to sell the
Product” to Integrated Commercialization Solutions, Inc. (ICS), and
ICS “desire[d] to purchase and distribute the Product.”147 The
agreement further forbade the Medicines Co. from selling Angiomax
to any other party for the duration of the contract.148 The Federal
Circuit found that the terms of the distribution agreement made clear
that Medicines Co. and ICS entered an agreement to sell and purchase
the product, and thus constituted a commercial offer for sale for
purposes of the on-sale bar.149 The Federal Circuit remanded to the
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1363–64.
Id.
Id. at 1364.
Id.
881 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1352–53.
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).
Medicines Co., 881 F.3d at 1349.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1352–53.
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district court to consider whether the distribution agreement covered
the patented product.150
The court dealt with the impact of prior reexamination decisions in
Exmark Manufacturing Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Products Group,
LLC.151 In this case, the Federal Circuit found that the district court
erred by basing its summary judgment of no invalidity solely on the fact
that the asserted claim survived multiple reexaminations.152 The court
held that a reexamination confirming patentability of a patent claim
alone is not determinative of whether a genuine issue of fact precludes
summary judgment of no invalidity.153 The holding is supported by
prior Federal Court decisions that a district court “is never bound by
an examiner’s finding in an ex parte patent application proceeding.”154
Instead, the deference owed to the decisions of the PTO takes the form
of the presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282.155 The
presumption of validity can be overcome by the patent challenger who
meets its burden of providing the factual elements of invalidity by clear
and convincing evidence.156
C. Obviousness
Most of the Federal Circuit’s decisions on obviousness do not warrant
extended discussion because they dealt with case-specific disputes about
underlying facts.157 This section discusses a few representative cases
from 2018 addressing interesting fact patterns and legal issues.
150. Id. at 1353–54.
151. 879 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
152. Id. at 1337.
153. Id. at 1341.
154. Id. (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’Real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming the PTAB’s determination that petitioner did not
establish a motivation to combine the prior art references); Yeda Research & Dev. Co.
v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 906 F.3d 1031, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming the PTAB’s
obviousness finding noting that it “do[es] not read Cyclobenzaprine as establishing a
rigid rule categorically precluding obviousness determinations without pk/pd data”);
ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 903 F.3d 1354, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(affirming the PTAB’s finding that apparatus claims were obvious because an
apparatus that is “capable of” performing certain functions may be anticipated by or
obvious in view of a prior art apparatus that can likewise perform these functions); IXI
IP, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 903 F.3d 1257, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that the
PTAB’s determination that a PHOSITA reading the applied reference would
understand that the cellphone is the master of the ad-hoc network and contains the
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Impax Laboratories Inc. v. Lannett Holdings Inc.158 highlights that
although obviousness is ultimately a legal question, the lower court’s
underlying findings of fact often dictate the outcome in the appeal.159
Lannett contended that the district court erred in concluding the
claims at issue would not have been obvious based on an erroneous
finding that the prior art taught away from nasal formulations of
zolmitriptan.160 Impax responded that the district court did not err
because it correctly found that a skilled artisan would not have been
motivated to make nasal formulations of zolmitriptan or have a
reasonable expectation of success in doing so.161 Based on the record,
the Federal Circuit held that the court clearly erred in its findings that
a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to make a zolmitriptan
nasal spray with a reasonable expectation of success.162 Zolmitriptan’s
known significant reliance on its active metabolite would have, on balance,
dissuaded a person of skill in the art from making nasal formulations of
zolmitriptan.163 Noting that “this case was close,” the Federal Circuit
affirmed, deferring to the district court in its fact findings.164
Next, In re Brandt165 involved an appeal from the examiner’s
obviousness finding during examination.166 The claim at issue
required that the recited coverboard have a density “less than [six]
LUS is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence); Luminara Worldwide, LLC
v. Iancu, 899 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming the PTAB’s finding of
obviousness and rejecting argument that the PTAB changed the obviousness argument
midstream); Sirona Dental Sys. GmbH v. Institut Straumann AG, 892 F.3d 1349, 1353–
54 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming obviousness judgment where substantial evidence
supported the PTAB’s finding that the combination discloses a limitation in the claims
and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine
the references); Elbit Sys. of Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc., 881 F.3d 1354, 1356–59
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming a non-obviousness judgment where substantial evidence
supported the PTAB’s finding that the prior art did not teach one element of the
challenged claims); Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 881 F.3d 894, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(affirming the Board’s obviousness determination for one group of claims because
“the ‘634 patent’s own description of” the prior art reference supported the PTAB’s
findings, and that was an “[a]dmission . . . binding on the patentee”).
158. 893 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
159. Id. at 1378–79.
160. Id. at 1378.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1380–81.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1382 (noting that “this case was close” because the evidence presented
by both sides was equally compelling).
165. 886 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
166. Id. at 1173.
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pounds per cubic foot.”167 The examiner rejected the claim based on
a reference disclosing a density between six and twenty-five pounds per
cubic foot, concluding that it would have been an obvious design
choice for a skilled artisan to have a coverboard with a density less than
six pounds per cubic foot.168 The PTAB affirmed the examiner’s
rejection and determined that the claims were prima facie obvious
based on the general rule that “when the difference between the
claimed invention and the prior art is the range or value of a particular
variable, then a prima facie rejection is properly established when the
difference in the range or value is minor.”169 The PTAB also found
that applicant did not rebut the prima facie rejection through
argument or evidence of unexpected results or teaching away nor did
applicant show that the low-end range of six pounds per cubic foot had
any different properties from a coverboard with a lower density of 5.99
pounds per cubic foot.170
The Federal Circuit affirmed finding that the PTAB’s factual
findings underlying the obviousness analysis were supported by
substantial evidence.171 The court explained one of the procedural
tools available to an examiner—the prima facie case of
unpatentability.172 If the examiner establishes a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the applicant to come forward with rebuttal evidence
or argument.173 The examiner then considers the evidence as a whole
before reaching a conclusion on the claims’ patentability under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).174 In this case, the court rejected the applicant’s
argument that the examiner can only find a case of obviousness when
there is an overlap between the claimed range and prior art range.175
Here, because the claimed range and prior art range abut one another,
and the applicant conceded as fact that there is no meaningful
distinction between the two ranges, the Federal Circuit determined
that substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s finding that the

167. Id. at 1173–74.
168. Id. at 1174.
169. Id. at 1175 (quoting Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775,
783 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1179.
172. Id. at 1175–76.
173. Id. at 1176.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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differences in density ranges “could not be smaller.”176 The Federal
Circuit also rejected the applicant’s teaching away argument that was
in essence an assertion that there is some criticality to having a
coverboard density of greater than six pounds per cubic foot because
applicant failed to introduce any supporting evidence.177
In ZUP, LLC v. Nash Manufacturing, Inc.,178 the Federal Circuit
addressed the methodology for considering secondary considerations
of nonobviousness.179 In its appeal, the patentee, ZUP, argued that the
district court improperly shifted the burden to prove non-obviousness
to ZUP.180 The majority “quickly dismissed” this argument and noted
that Federal Circuit precedent is clear that “the burden of persuasion
remains with the challenger during litigation because every issued
patent is entitled to a presumption of validity.”181 The majority then
found that even when all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of
ZUP, the “weak evidence of secondary considerations presented here
simply cannot overcome the strong showing of obviousness.”182 Judge
Newman dissented and argued that the majority improperly held that
only three of the four Graham v. John Deere Co.183 factors are considered
in order to establish a prima facie case of obviousness, and the fourth
Graham factor is applied only in rebuttal, whereby it must outweigh and
rebut the first three factors.184 Instead, Judge Newman argued that
secondary consideration evidence must be considered together with
the other evidence and not separated out and required to outweigh or
rebut the other factors.185
In E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V.,186 the Federal Circuit
reversed the PTAB’s finding that the petitioner failed to prove that the
challenged claims were obvious because the PTAB applied the wrong

176. Id. at 1177–78.
177. Id. at 1178.
178. 896 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
179. Id. at 1374.
180. Id. at 1373.
181. Id. (quoting Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 719 F.3d 1346,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
182. Id. at 1375.
183. 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) (establishing the four factor test for non-obviousness as
(1) ascertain the prior art; (2) differentiate the prior art and the claims; (3) ascertain
the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) take into account any secondary
considerations of non-obviousness).
184. Zup, LLC, 896 F.3d at 1380 (Newman, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1381.
186. 904 F.3d 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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legal standards for obviousness.187 Specifically, the Federal Circuit found
that the PTAB erred in concluding that the type of burden-shifting
framework consistently applied in the Federal Circuit’s overlapping range
cases was implicitly foreclosed by subsequent cases not addressing this
framework.188 Neither In re Magnum Oil Tools International, Ltd.,189 nor
Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc.190 forecloses application
of this burden-shifting framework in the IPR context.191
For decades, the Federal Circuit and its predecessor have recognized
that “where the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior
art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by
routine experimentation.”192 An application of this principle is that
“[a] prima facie case of obviousness typically exists when the ranges of
a claimed composition overlap the ranges disclosed in the prior art.”193
Such an overlap creates a presumption of obviousness that a patentee
may rebut in several ways.194 That is, where there is a range disclosed
in the prior art, and the claimed invention falls within that range, the
burden of production falls upon the patentee to come forward with
evidence of nonobviousness.195 For example, a modification of a
process parameter may be patentable if it “produce[s] a new and
unexpected result which is different in kind and not merely in degree
from the results of the prior art.”196 A claimed range that demonstrates
such unexpected results is referred to as a “critical” range, and the
patentee has the burden of proving criticality.197 A patentee may rebut
the presumption of obviousness by showing that the prior art taught
away from the claimed range.198 Additionally, a change to a parameter
may be patentable if the parameter was not recognized as “result-

187. Id. at 999.
188. Id. at 1006.
189. 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (discussing the precedent of burdenshifting frameworks and the applicability in IPR cases).
190. 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the burden-shifting
framework could be appropriate in the context of IPR).
191. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 904 F.3d at 1002–03.
192. Id. at 1006 (citing In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469–70 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Woodruff,
919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (C.C.P.A. 1955)).
193. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 904 F.3d at 1006.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1006 (citing Aller, 220 F.2d at 456).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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effective.”199 The factfinder then assesses that evidence, along with all
other evidence of record, to determine whether a patent challenger has
carried its burden of persuasion to prove that the claimed range was
obvious.200 In this case, the presumption of obviousness applied and the
patentee failed to show any of the means to rebut obviousness.201
“Incorporation by reference” is a common practice in patent
drafting that incorporates the disclosure of another document into a
patent by including a simple reference statement to that document.
Disputes on the scope of incorporation typically arise when one party
attempts to rely on the incorporated material to support an
anticipation or obviousness challenge. In Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co.,202
the Federal Circuit addressed an interesting twist on incorporation by
reference—the effect of incorporation by reference on priority date of
an asserted patent. In response to a patent infringement suit, Ford
filed twenty-five IPR proceedings against Paice, including those that
led to the six proceedings against two patents at issue in this appeal.203
The PTAB found that a Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) publication,
in view of a patent to Severinsky, rendered a set of challenged claims
obvious.204 Paice argued that the PCT publication was not prior art
because both challenged patents claimed priority to a patent
application which predated the PCT publication and incorporated the
Severinsky patent by reference, providing written description support
for the claims.205 The PTAB rejected these arguments and determined
that the application did not incorporate Severinsky, and the claims
therefore lacked written description support.206 The Federal Circuit
disagreed and found that the language “is incorporated herein by this
reference” sufficiently incorporated the entire Severinsky patent despite
other language stating that only portions of Severinsky would be
applicable to the application’s purportedly new and improved hybrid
vehicle.207 The court noted that “[t]he applicability of a document’s
199. Id. (citing In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
200. Id. at 1007.
201. Id. at 1007–08.
202. 881 F.3d 894 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
203. Id. at 899–900.
204. Id. at 906. The “Severinsky” patent is named after Alexei “Alex” Severinsky, a Russian
inventor who invented and patented the Hyperdrive power-amplified internal combustion
engine power train. See About Paice, PAICE, http://www.paicehybrid.com/about (last visited
May 20, 2019).
205. Paice LLC, 881 F.3d at 906.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 907.
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disclosed features and the incorporation of the document itself are
distinct concepts.”208 The court remanded for a determination of whether
the priority patent application, with the Severinsky patent incorporated,
provided adequate written description support for the claims.209
D. Indefiniteness
One case in 2018 dealt with the issue of indefiniteness. In Berkheimer
v. HP Inc.,210 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
determination that the asserted claims were indefinite.211 The claims
at issue each recited the term “minimal redundancy.”212 Because the
specification uses inconsistent terminology to describe the level of
redundancy that the system achieves and neither the claims nor the
prosecution history add clarity, the Federal Circuit found that it was
not clear error for the district court to find that a skilled artisan would
not have known the meaning of “minimal redundancy” with
reasonable certainty.213 The court stressed that it was not holding that
“all terms of degree are indefinite,” only that the term “minimal
redundancy” is indefinite in light of the evidence.214
E. Written Description and Enablement
In 2018, the Federal Circuit addressed a relatively high number of
cases involving written decision and enablement. One common fact
pattern in these 2018 cases used written description to attack priority
benefit claims. For example, in D Three Enterprises, LLC v. SunModo
Corp.,215 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that an
asserted patent was not entitled to claim priority benefit to its
provisional because the provisional lacked adequate written
description support for the claimed subject matter. In the district
court litigation, because the accused product was available to the
public after the filing of the provisional application but before the
filing of the asserted patents,216 the patentee had to establish priority
benefit to the provisional application to assert the patents against the
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 908.
Id. at 910–11.
881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1363.
Id.
Id. at 1364.
890 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1045.
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accused product.217 To claim priority benefit, a patent application
must disclose the claimed subject matter “in the manner provided by
§ 112(a)” which states that “[t]he specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
[a PHOSITA] to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same.”218
On summary judgment, the district court determined that the asserted
claims were not entitled to priority benefit of the provisional
application because they were broader than the invention disclosed in
the provisional such that they did not meet the written description
requirement.219 The Federal Circuit affirmed and noted that “[i]t is
not sufficient for purposes of the written description requirement of
§ 112 that the disclosure, when combined with the knowledge in the
art, would lead one to speculate as to the modifications that the
inventor might have envisioned, but failed to disclose.”220 The court
also found that the statement in the patent that said “[i]t is therefore
intended that the following appended claims hereinafter introduced
are interpreted to include all such modifications, permutations,
additions and subcombinations are within their true sprit [sic] and
scope” was merely boilerplate language, insufficient to show adequate
disclosure of the claims.221
Written description disputes also arise in cases involving genusspecies claims. Knowles Electronics LLC v. Cirrus Logic, Inc.222 addressed
the PTAB’s determination that although the specification disclosed a
genus, solder pads that are capable of being connected to a board, it
failed to provide adequate written description support for the claimed
species, pads that are connectable to a board specifically by using a
reflow process.223 The Federal Circuit affirmed and found substantial
evidence supported the PTAB’s determination that the specification
does not provide adequate written description to allow a person having
of ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) to recognize the inventor
invented what is claimed.224 The court also rejected Knowles’s
contention that PTAB disregarded “the state of the art at the time of
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id. at 1047 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a), 120 (2012)).
Id.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1050–51.
883 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1366.
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filing” and the “prior art knowledge” that would have demonstrated that
a PHOSITA knew solder pads were intended to be capable of reflow
attachment to a user’s board.225 Because of the conflicting views
presented on the knowledge of a PHOSITA, the Federal Circuit
determined that the PTAB reasonably found that a PHOSITA would not
have recognized that the inventor possessed solder pads “configured to”
connect to a printed circuit board through a reflow process.226
In addition to interesting legal issues when assessing obviousness,
claimed ranges are also often subjects of written description disputes.
In 2018, the Federal Circuit addressed written description support for
a claimed range General Hospital Corp. v. Sienna Biopharmaceuticals,
Inc.227 In an interference, the PTAB determined that the application
lacked written description support and dismissed the interference
proceeding.228 After construing the term about in the representative
claim to mean “within 10%,” the PTAB found that none of the
disclosed values in the application fall within the claimed 10% value.229
The specification also broadly stated that in an embodiment the
particles have an optical density of at least “about 1 O.D” but does not
expressly identify a maximum concentration.230 Where a specification
discloses a broad range of values and a value within that range is
claimed, the disclosure must allow one skilled in the art to
“immediately discern the limitation at issue in the claims.”231 The
Federal Circuit determined that substantial evidence supported the
PTAB’s determination that the examples provided in the specification,
including disclosure of a range that only minimally overlapped with the
claimed range, do not provide written description support for the claim
term, noting “one cannot disclose a forest in the original application,
and then pick a tree out of the forest and say here is my invention.”232
The Federal Circuit addressed enablement in one case in 2018—In
Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co.233 In this case, the
Federal Circuit reversed the denial of the defendant’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law that the asserted patent was not enabled

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id.
888 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1370–72.
Id.
Id. (citing Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 1372–73.
896 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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as a matter of law.234 “[T]o be enabling, the specification of a patent
must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope
of the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”235 The
claim at issue in this case recited “a non-single crystalline buffer layer”
and “a growth layer grown on the buffer layer.”236 The court construed
“non-single crystalline buffer layer” to encompass polycrystalline,
amorphous, or a mixture of polycrystalline and amorphous.237 The
constructions resulted in six permutations for the relationship
between the growth layer and the buffer layer.238 The enablement issue
concerned only one of the six permutations—a monocrystalline
growth layer formed directly on an amorphous buffer layer.239 Because
experts for both parties agreed that it is “impossible to epitaxially grow
a monocrystalline film directly on an amorphous structure,” the
Federal Circuit noted that it could “safely conclude that the
specification does not enable what the experts agree is physically
impossible.”240 Because “the specification must enable the full scope
of the claimed invention,” the Federal Circuit rejected the patentee’s
argument that the enabling disclosure of five out of six permutations
was sufficient.241 The Federal Circuit also rejected the patentee’s
evidence that others have successfully grown a monocrystalline layer
directly on an amorphous layer because patentee’s evidence did not
suggest that these results were accomplished by following the
specification’s teachings or that achieving these results was within an
ordinary artisan’s skill as of the patent’s effective filing date.242 Because
“[t]he inquiry is whether the patent’s specification taught one of skill
in the art how to make such a device without undue experimentation
as of the patent’s effective filing date,” the Federal Circuit found that
the patentee’s evidence was not probative of enablement.243

234. Id. at 1358.
235. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(alteration in original) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
236. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 896 F.3d at 1360 (emphasis omitted).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1362.
241. Id. at 1364.
242. Id. at 1363–64.
243. Id. at 1363.
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F. Obviousness-Type Double Patenting
Obviousness-type double patenting is an equitable doctrine with a
goal of avoiding an unfair extension of patent term to a patentee.
Invalidity attacks based on obviousness-type double patenting are rare
and often involve a detailed analysis of the prosecution history to
determine whether the one-way or two-way test applies and whether
the patentee is entitled to benefit of the statutory safe harbor. For
example, in In re Janssen Biotech, Inc.,244 the Federal Circuit addressed
the application of the safe harbor provision, 35 U.S.C. § 121,245 in an
obviousness-type double patenting case.246 The applicant filed the
patent at issue as a continuation-in-part (CIP) including subject matter
from its parent application and additional matter from another
previously filed application.247 However, the patent issued with claims
directed to subject matter in only the parent application and not to the
added subject matter.248 The PTO subsequently granted an ex parte
reexamination finding the claims unpatentable based on obviousnesstype double patenting over three patents.249
During the reexamination proceeding, Janssen requested that the
patent specification be amended to delete portions that were not
present in the parent application so that the patent can be designated
a divisional of the parent application, rather than a CIP.250 The PTO
entered the amendments but did not confirm the status of the patent
as a divisional.251 After determining that the safe harbor provision of
§ 121 did not apply,252 the examiner determined that the claims were
unpatentable under the one-way test for double patenting.253 The
PTAB affirmed the double patenting rejections on appeal.254 The
threshold issue in the appeal was whether the § 121 safe harbor
244. 880 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
245. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012); Janssen, 880 F.3d at 1321 (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. 518 F.3d 1353, 1360–62 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (explaining that the safe
harbor provision only applies to the original application and the original patent, or
the divisional applications and patents issued on divisional applications; patents issued
on continuation-in-part applications are not entitled to protection under the statute).
246. Janssen, 880 F.3d at 1317–18.
247. Id. at 1318–19.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1317–18.
250. Id. at 1320.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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provision applied and protected the patent from invalidation based on
the reference patents.255 The Federal Circuit stressed that “aside from
the original application and the original patent, the protection
afforded by § 121 is limited to divisional applications and patents
issued on divisional applications.”256 Here, the applicant voluntarily
and deliberately filed an application properly designated as a CIP and
the challenged patent issued from that CIP application, not a divisional
application as required by the § 121 safe harbor provision. The
Federal Circuit held that the patent owner cannot retroactively bring
the challenged patent within the scope of the § 121 safe harbor
provision by amending the CIP application during a reexamination to
re-designate it as a divisional application.257
The Federal Circuit next turned to the issue of whether the PTAB’s
application of the one-way test for obviousness double patenting was
proper. The one-way test asks whether the “application claims are obvious
over the patent claims,” whereas the two-way test additionally asks
“whether the patent claims are obvious over the application claims.”258
The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s rejection under the doctrine of
obviousness-type double patenting, finding that patent owner was not
entitled to the two-way test for obviousness double patenting.259
In UCB, Inc. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc.,260 a Hatch-Waxman261 case, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the challenged
claims were not invalid for obviousness-type double patenting.262 As
part of the double patenting inquiry, the court construes the claims in
the earlier and later patents and determines the differences.263 The
court then determines whether those differences render the claims
patentably distinct.264 The dispute in UCB centered on how the two-step
analysis should be applied. However, the majority found that the asserted
claims were not invalid under either of the competing approaches
255. Id. at 1321.
256. Id. (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
257. Id. at 1322.
258. Id. at 1325.
259. Id. at 1325–26.
260. 890 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
261. Id. at 1317. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,
otherwise known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, is a 1984 federal law that amends the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to authorize abbreviated applications for the approval
of generic drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
262. UCB, Inc., 890 F.3d at 1317.
263. Id. at 1323.
264. Id.
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because a PHOSITA would not have had reason to modify the earlier
compound to arrive at lacosamide and would not have had a reasonable
expectation of success.265 Chief Judge Prost dissented and argued that the
prior art supported a reasonable expectation of success.266
III. INFRINGEMENT
Many of the Federal Circuit’s infringement cases were routine and
upheld lower courts factual findings.267 However, several cases
addressed interesting fact patterns and uncommon points of law. One
case, Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. v. Renesas Electronics
America, Inc.,268 addressed the impact on infringement for a product
that includes an infringing feature that is incapable of being used.269
At trial, the jury found infringement of both method and system claims
based on the inclusion of a specific mode in the products, referred to
as “Mode 3.”270 Because there was no evidence that the accused
products actually used Mode 3, the Federal Circuit reversed the verdict
of infringement of the method claims.271 However, the court affirmed
the judgment of infringement of the apparatus claims because
infringement of apparatus claims requires that the accused products
have the ability to perform in Mode 3; it does not require actual use of
the accused products in Mode 3.272
Polara Engineering Inc. v. Campbell Co.273 involved the issue of public
and experiment use of a claimed invention. In the district court
proceeding, the jury found that the asserted claims directed to a
control system for crosswalk stations were not proven to be invalid.274
However, prior to the priority date of the patent, the patentee tested

265. Id. at 1327–29.
266. Id. at 1330–31 (Prost, C.J., dissenting).
267. See Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 894 F.3d
1258, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (determining substantial evidence supported the jury’s
conclusion and affirming the verdict of infringement); FastShip, LLC v. United States, 892
F.3d 1298, 1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Ottah v. Fiat Chrysler, 884 F.3d 1135, 1140 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement
because no reasonable fact finder could find that the accused cameras which require tools
to remove them met the “removably attached” limitation of the claim).
268. 895 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
269. Id. at 1327.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. 894 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
274. Id. at 1347.
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prototypes satisfying the limitations of the asserted claims.275 Following
post-trial motions, the district court upheld the jury’s verdict that the
invention was not invalid based on this public use because substantial
evidence supported the jury’s finding that the installation of
prototypes was experimental use necessary to ensure that the invention
would work for its intended purpose.276 Under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b), “[a] person shall be entitled a patent unless . . . the invention
was . . . in public use . . . in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States.”277
However, “an inventor who seeks to perfect his discovery may conduct
extensive testing without losing his right to obtain a patent for his
invention—even if such testing occurs in the public eye.”278 The
Federal Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict and found that “substantial
evidence supports the jury’s finding of experimental use that negates
the application of the public use bar.”279 After articulating the factors
that may be relevant to determining whether a use is experimental,280
the court noted that because invention relates to public safety, “the
inventors could reasonably believe that they needed to ensure the
invention’s durability and safety before being certain that it would
work for its intended purpose.”281
In another Hatch-Waman case, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Amneal
Pharmaceuticals LLC,282 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
finding of non-infringement and held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request for additional

275. Id. at 1345.
276. Id. at 1344.
277. Id. at 1348.
278. Id. (quoting Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998)).
279. Id. at 1349.
280. The factors that may be relevant to determining whether a use is experimental include:
(1) the necessity for public testing, (2) the amount of control over the
experiment retained by the inventor, (3) the nature of the invention, (4) the
length of the test period, (5) whether payment was made, (6) whether there
was a secrecy obligation, (7) whether records of the experiment were kept, (8)
who conducted the experiment, (9) the degree of commercial exploitation
during testing, (10) whether the invention reasonably requires evaluation
under actual conditions of use, (11) whether testing was systematically
performed, (12) whether the inventor continually monitored the invention
during testing, and (13) the nature of contacts made with potential customers.
Clock Spring, L.P. v. Wrapmaster, Inc., 560 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
281. Polara, 894 F.3d at 1350.
282. 881 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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samples of the accused product.283 The asserted patent claims involved
mometasone furoate monohydrate (MFM), which is an ingredient in
In 2014, Amneal filed an
Merck’s Nasonex nasal product.284
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking approval to market
a generic nasal spray containing corticosteroid anhydrous mometasone
furoate,285 and sent Merck a notice letter certifying that its proposed
product would not infringe the asserted patent claims and that the
asserted patent was invalid.286 Merck subsequently filed an infringement
suit against Amneal.287 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
required Amneal to complete a bulk-hold study in which Amneal’s
commercial batch would be held for a four-day period before being
packaged into nasal spray bottles.288 Amneal drew samples from the batch
on the first day (“Day 1 Batch”) and on the fourth day (“Day 4 Batch”).289
After the bulk-hold study was completed, it mixed a 100 kg commercial
batch and bottled it for storage (“A Batch”).290 Amneal produced samples
from the Day 1 Batch to Merck but did not provide samples of either the
Day 4 Batch or the A Batch.291 The district court did not compel Amneal
to produce these samples but instead gave Merck the opportunity to prove
at trial that the Day 4 and A Batch samples were substantively different
than the Day 1 Batch samples.292 The district court then found that Merck
failed to carry its burden of proving infringement.293
The Federal Circuit affirmed. After noting the question was a close
one, the Federal Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it decided to proceed to trial as opposed to ordering
additional discovery and delaying trial.294 The court determined that
the district court took adequate steps to ensure that proceeding to trial
would not prejudice Merck, including giving Merck the opportunity to
prove at trial that the Day 4 and A Batch samples were different than
the Day 1 Batch samples for purposes of infringement.295 Regarding
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1380.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1382.
Id.
Id.
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infringement, the Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district
court’s fact finding that three Raman peaks were required and that
Amneal’s ANDA product will not infringe.296
Because design patents are not usually asserted in patent
infringement cases, the Federal Circuit does not often issue opinions
associated with design patents. However, in 2018, the Federal Circuit
considered the application of prosecution history estoppel in a design
patent infringement context in Advantech Marketing, Inc. v. Shanghai
Walk-Long Tools, Co.297 Advantek sued its former manufacturer, Shanghai
Walk-Long Tools (“Walk-Long”), for infringement of its design patent for
a portable animal cage.298 The district court granted judgment on the
pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), holding that
prosecution history estoppel barred Advantek from enforcing its design
patent against the accused product.299 The Federal Circuit reversed.
Prosecution history estoppel in a design patent case depends on:
“(1) whether there was a surrender; (2) whether it was for reasons of
patentability; and (3) whether the accused design is within the scope
of the surrender.”300 During prosecution of the patent at issue, the
examiner required the patentee to elect to prosecute claims to either
a kennel without a cover or a kennel with a cover.301 Advantek elected
to prosecute the embodiment of a kennel without a cover.302 Based on
this prosecution history, the Federal Circuit found that Advantek
elected to patent the ornamental design for a kennel with a particular
skeletal structure.303 A competitor selling a kennel embodying the
patented structure infringes Advantek’s patent, regardless of any extra
features that the competitor might add to the kennel.304 The Federal
Circuit concluded that Advantek was not estopped by the prosecution
history from asserting its design patent against Walk-Long.305
296. Id. at 1385–86. Raman spectroscopy is a vibrational spectroscopy technique,
used to observe how a molecule vibrates in a crystal for the purpose of differentiating
between crystalline forms. See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC,
235 F. Supp. 3d 625, 632 (D. Del. 2017) (discussing the procedure and the
development of maps for analytical purposes).
297. 898 F.3d 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
298. Id. at 1211–12.
299. Id. at 1212.
300. Id. at 1215.
301. Id. at 1214.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1216–17.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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IV. EQUITABLE DEFENSES
In addition to defenses based on on-infringement and invalidity, a
party accused of infringement can assert a set of equitable defenses
based on the conduct of the patentee. These defenses are nonstatutory and are highly fact dependent. In 2018, the Federal Circuit
addressed a wide variety of cases involving equitable defenses ranging
from instances of litigation misconduct to improper conduct during
prosecution of the asserted patents.
A. Unclean Hands
In Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Merck & Co.,306 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s holding that Merck could not enforce the two
asserted patents because its conduct gave it unclean hands.307
[D]etermination of unclean hands may be reached when
“misconduct” of a party seeking relief “has immediate and necessary
relation to the equity that he seeks in respect of the matter in
litigation,” i.e., “for such violations of conscience as in some measure
affect the equitable relations between the parties in respect of
something brought before the court.308

The doctrine “necessarily gives wide range to the equity court’s use of
discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant.”309
Here, the Federal Circuit determined, based on the totality of the
evidence-supported misconduct, the district court properly found that
the patentee engaged in pre-litigation business misconduct.310 First,
Merck violated an agreed upon “firewall” by permitting an employee
involved in related patent prosecution to participate in a conference
call with Pharmasset311 representatives discussing the structure of its
compound for treating Hepatitis C.312 Merck compounded this
violation by continuing to use this employee in related patent
prosecutions after the call.313 The evidence supported the district
court’s finding that the employee’s improperly acquired knowledge of

306. 888 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
307. Id. at 1239.
308. Id. (quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933)).
309. Id. (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 815 (1945)).
310. Id. at 1240–41.
311. Pharmasset was later acquired by Gilead.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1241.
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Pharmasset’s compound influenced Merck’s prosecution strategy and
was directly connected to the present patent litigation.314
The Federal Circuit also determined that misconduct continued
into the litigation.315 First, the court found that the employee gave
intentionally false testimony that he did not participate in the
conference call.316 Second, the court found that the employee’s
testimony about the role of the Pharmasset’s compound in its
prosecution of amended claims was “so incredible as to be
intentionally false.”317 The Federal Circuit also found no abuse in
discretion in the district court’s conclusion that the unclean hands
defense extended to both asserted patents.318 In addition to finding
that the employee played a key role in the prosecution of both patents,
the district court concluded that “Merck’s litigation misconduct infects
the entire lawsuit, including the enforceability of the ‘712 Patent.”319
B. Inequitable Conduct
Inequitable conduct is an equitable issue committed to the
discretion of the trial court and is, therefore, reviewed by the Federal
Circuit under an abuse of discretion standard.320 In Energy Heating,
LLC v. Heat On-the-Fly, LLC,321 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s conclusion that the asserted patent was unenforceable for
inequitable conduct.322 The patent-at-issue involved a method and
apparatus “for the continuous preparation of heated water flow for use
in hydraulic fracturing” (also known as “fracing”).323 The sole inventor
knew that the patent process required that he file his application
within one year of the first offer for sale or public use; yet, he did not
disclose any of his companies sixty-one frac jobs that used the system
to the PTO during prosecution as potential on-sale or public uses.324
The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not err in finding

314. Id.
315. Id. at 1244.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1247.
319. Id. at 1233, 1247 (‘712 Patent is short for U.S. Patent No. 8,481,712, one of the
two patents relating to treatments of Hepatitis C involved in the case).
320. Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
321. 889 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
322. Id. at 1299.
323. Id. at 1296–97.
324. Id. at 1297–98.
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the prior frac jobs were not experimental. Because the continuation
patent was issued after the district court’s judgment and had claims
that were materially different, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by not considering the PTO’s issuance of a continuation
patent in which the frac jobs were disclosed.325 Finally, the Federal
Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding there was clear and convincing evidence “the inventor knew
that the prior frac jobs were material and specifically intended to
deceive the PTO by not disclosing these jobs.”326
C. Laches
The equitable defenses of laches and equitable estoppel can arise
when a patent holder delays action against an alleged infringer. In
John Bean Technologies Corp. v. Morris & Associates, Inc.,327 the Federal
Circuit was confronted with intersection of laches and ex parte
reexamination. In June 2002, U.S. Patent No. 6,397,622 (“the ‘622
patent”) issued two claims.328 Shortly after issuance, the defendant sent
the patent owner a demand letter notifying the patent owner that the
defendant believed the patent to be invalid and stating that any
statements that assert infringement made from this point were likely to be
met with a suit for unfair competition.329 The patent owner did not
respond to the demand letter.330 In December 2013, eleven years after
the ‘622 patent was issued, the patent owner filed an ex parte
reexamination.331 During that proceeding, the patent owner amended
both of the original claims and added six additional claims.332 After the
PTO issued a reexamination certificate in 2013, the patent owner sued
the defendant for infringement from the date the reexamination
certificate issued.333 The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendant holding that the infringement action was barred by both laches
and equitable estoppel because the patent owner’s decade-long silence was
misleading conduct on which the defendant relied, and the defendant

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at 1301–02.
Id. at 1302.
887 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1324.
Id. at 1324–25.
Id. at 1325.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1326.
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would be materially prejudiced if the patent owner was permitted to pursue
its infringement case.334 The Federal Circuit disagreed and reversed.
The parties agreed that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in
SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC,335
which held “that laches cannot be asserted as a defense to
infringement occurring within the six-year period prior to the filing of
a complaint for infringement,” barred Morris & Associates’ laches
defense,336 leaving only the defense of equitable estoppel. Because
amended and issued reexamination claims cannot be broader than the
original claims, the validity analysis for reexamination claims
necessarily differs and what constitutes an infringing product can
change.”337 Because the asserted claims did not exist at, or were
substantively altered since the time defendant sent patent owner the
demand letter, the Federal Circuit determined that the patent owner
“could not have engaged in misleading conduct or silence with respect
to those claims.”338 The district court’s application of equitable
estoppel was therefore an abuse of discretion.339
D. Implied Waiver
The conduct of a patentee during interaction with standards setting
organization can also be the basis of an equitable defense called
implied waiver. The Federal Circuit considered the scope of implied
waiver in Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc.340 The asserted
patent in this case specifically refers to a version of the General Packet
Radio Service (GPRS) standard that was being considered by the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) at the time
of the patent application.341 When ETSI was developing proposals to
address the problem of propagation delay in GPRS networks, Nokia
submitted a proposal by the inventor of the asserted patent to ETSI,
and ETSI initially recommended implementing the proposal in the
standard.342 Contemporaneously, Nokia filed a Finnish patent
application based on the invention, to which the asserted patent
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id. at 1326–27.
137 S. Ct. 954 (2017).
John Bean Techs. Corp., 887 F.3d at 1324 n.1 (citing SCA Hygiene Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 954).
Id.
Id. at 1328.
Id.
899 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1365.
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claimed priority.343 ETSI however subsequently rejected Nokia’s
proposal.344 Four years later, Nokia disclosed the Finnish patent
application and the U.S. patent application to ETSI.345
The court explained that “a participant in a standards-setting
organization may waive its right to assert infringement claims against
products that practice the standard.”346 Such a wavier is implied when
the patentee’s “conduct was so inconsistent with an intent to enforce
its rights as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been
relinquished.”347 Conduct supporting implied waiver exists when “(1)
the patentee had a duty of disclosure to the standard setting
organization, and (2) the patentee breached that duty.”348 The district
court determined that Nokia did not have a duty to disclose the Finnish
application because ETSI rejected Nokia’s proposal.349 The district
court also stated that “Apple presented no evidence that any ETSI
member or other entity interpreted Nokia’s failure to disclose the
patent . . . as evidence that Nokia relinquished its patent rights.”350 The
Federal Circuit found that none of these reasons supported the district
court’s conclusion.351 Rather than reversing, the Federal Circuit
remanded for additional proceedings because it was “possible to interpret
the district court’s ruling as being based on the conclusion that, because
Nokia’s proposal was not adopted, no inequitable consequence flowed
from Nokia’s failure to disclose its patent application.”352
V. PATENT OFFICE APPEALS
Appeals from the PTAB continued to dominant the Federal Circuit’s
case load in 2018. The Federal Circuit decided 226 PTAB appeals last
year with most of these cases being appeals from AIA post-grant
proceedings. Supreme Court decisions issued in early 2018 had the
potential to dramatically change the practice of invalidation
proceedings in the United States. In April, the Supreme Court issued

343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. (citing Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336, 1347–48
(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 1366.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 1367.
352. Id. at 1368.
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its much-anticipated decision on the constitutionality of AIA post-grant
challenges in Oil States Energy Services LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group,
In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the
LLC.353
constitutionality of inter partes review proceedings. The Supreme
Court’s decision in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu354 issued on the same day
had a dramatic impact on post-grant practice. In SAS, the Supreme
Court overruled the PTAB’s practice of partial institution and created a
ripple effect at the Federal Circuit in cases on appeal having a partial
institution on either claims or grounds.355 Many of the Federal Circuit’s
decisions in the second quarter of 2018 addressed procedural issues
created by the SAS decision. While the Federal Circuit continued to
affirm about half of all PTAB appeals in summary affirmances, referred
to as Rule 36 affirmances, many of the Federal Circuit’s decisions
addressed unsettled issues of statutory interpretation.
A. AIA Post-Grant Proceedings
1.

Jurisdiction and standing
In § 314(d), Congress explicitly limited the court’s jurisdiction over
appeals from PTAB institutional decisions.356 That provision states that
“[t]he determination by the Director whether to institute an [IPR]
under this section shall be final and non-appealable.”357 Since 2015,
the Federal Circuit broadly applied § 314(d) to deny itself jurisdiction
over appeals seeking review of the PTAB’s decisions of whether a
petitioner was statutorily barred under § 315(b).358
However, in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.,359 the court reversed
course. The en banc court reconsidered whether § 314(d) prohibits
review of questions relating to the time bar in view of the Supreme
Court’s analysis of § 314(d) in Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee.360 In a
9–4 decision, the Federal Circuit overruled Achates Reference Publishing,
Inc. v. Apple Inc.361 and expanded its jurisdiction over PTAB appeals
relating to the statutory bar of § 315(b).362 The Federal Circuit noted
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
Id. at 1358.
35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012).
Id.
See Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 658 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016); Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1367, 1369.
803 F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1375.

1302

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1263

that a prohibition on reviewability requires clear indication by
Congress in view of the strong presumption of reviewability of agency
action.363 The court interpreted Cuozzo to suggest that § 314(d) only
forbids review of “determinations closely related to the preliminary
patentability determination or the exercise of discretion not to
institute.”364 Finding the statutory bar of § 315(b) unrelated to either
category, the court held that it had jurisdiction to review PTAB
determinations related to § 315(b).365 The court has since extended
this holding to encompass assignor estoppel.366
The court took on Article III standing in Altaire Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Paragon Bioteck, Inc.367 “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the
traditional understanding of a case or controversy required by Article
III.”368 To have standing to challenge the decision of a lower tribunal,
an appellant “must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged [action], and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”369 Because inter partes
reviews can be filed by anyone other than the patent owner, the lack
of Article III standing can preclude a petitioner from appealing an
adverse decision of the PTAB.
In 2011, Altair and Paragon entered into an agreement to pursue
FDA approval for Altaire’s products, including R-phenylephrine
hydrochloride products containing a 2.5% and a 10% phenylephrine
hydrochloride ophthalmic solution.370 Paragon, pursuant to the
agreement, submitted a new drug application (NDA).371 The FDA
responded by recommending that Paragon “[c]onsider adding a chiral
purity test to the d[r]ug product specification.”372 Altaire performed
the recommended tests and provided a summary of the test results to

363. Id. at 1371–72.
364. Id. at 1373. The en banc court remanded the case to the original panel to
determine whether the petitioner was time barred. See id. at 1375.
365. Id.
366. See Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 908 F.3d 792, 800–01 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (finding that the logic of Wi-Fi One abrogated the court’s previous holding in
Husky Injection Molding Sys. Ltd. v. Athena Automation Ltd., 838 F.3d 1236, 1241
(Fed. Cir. 2016), that assignor estoppel was not reviewable).
367. 889 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
368. Id. at 1281 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)).
369. Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct at 1547).
370. Id. at 1278.
371. Id.
372. Id.
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Paragon who submitted a supplementary NDA filing to the FDA.373
Paragon later proposed an amendment to the agreement that
addressed a new patent application filing.374 Altaire responded that
the formulation, processes, and controls were developed solely by
Altaire’s CEO and were confidential information of Altaire.375 There
was no indication in the record that Paragon’s counsel responded to
Altaire’s substantive comments.376
In November 2013, Paragon filed a drug patent application, which
subsequently was issued as U.S. Patent No. 8,859,623.377 In April 2015,
Altaire filed a complaint against Paragon that alleged breach of a
nondisclosure clause of the parties’ agreement.378 In May 2015, Altaire
filed a petition for post-grant review of the challenged patent supported
by a declaration from its chief executive.379 In its final written decision,
the PTAB determined that Altaire failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the challenged claims would have been obvious and
that Altaire failed to timely qualify its chief executive as an expert.380
Subsequently, in April 2017, Altaire filed a complaint seeking a
declaratory judgment of invalidity of the ‘623 patent.381
The Federal Circuit found that Altaire sufficiently demonstrated
imminent harm, noting that Altaire intended to file an ANDA once the
agreement is terminated and resume marketing its proprietary
formation of the products and that Paragon refused to stipulate that it
will not sue Altaire for infringement.382 The Federal Circuit recognized
that while “[a] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon
contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all,” under the circumstances here, Altaire’s injury is
inevitable.383 Because the agreement between the parties prevents
Altaire from manufacturing its products, the Federal Circuit also
found that the injury was concrete and particularized.384 Judge Schall
dissented, disagreeing as to whether Altaire demonstrated imminent
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1279.
Id.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1282–83.
Id. at 1283.
Id.
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harm.385 Judge Schall argued that at this point, one of two things will
happen in the breach of contract suit—either Altaire or Paragon will
prevail. If Paragon prevailed, Paragon might have the right to
terminate the agreement.”386 If Altaire prevailed, the critical linchpin
of Altaire’s claim of imminent harm—the possibility that Paragon will
be given the right to terminate the agreement—will have been
eliminated.387 Judge Schall therefore concluded that a determination
of imminent harm is speculative and did not warrant a determination
of Article III standing for Altaire.388
In another Article III standing case, JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive
Ltd.,389 the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal by the petitioner,
JTEKT, because JTEKT lacked Article III standing to appeal.390 JTEKT
filed an IPR petition against a patent owned by GKN. In a mixed
decision, the PTAB found a subset of the challenged claims were not
proven by JTEKT to be unpatentable.391 Because JTEKT does not have
a product on the market, to establish Article III standing for an appeal
of the adverse decision, JTEKT was required to show that “it has
concrete plans for future activity that creates a substantial risk of future
infringement or likely cause the patentee to assert a claim of
infringement.”392 The Federal Circuit found that JTEKT’s evidence
did not establish that its planned product would create a substantial
risk of infringement or likely lead to charges of infringement.393 The
Federal Circuit rejected JTEKT’s argument that IPR estoppel
“constitutes a separate, and independent, injury in fact,” explaining
that “estoppel provisions do not constitute an injury in fact when the
appellant is not engaged in any activity that would give rise to a possible
infringement suit.”394 However, in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Synvina C.V.,395 the Federal Circuit found that DuPont had Article III
standing despite not facing a specific threat of infringement litigation

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id. at 1289 (Schall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1289, 1291.
898 F.3d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1218–19.
Id.
Id. at 1220–21.
Id. at 1221.
Id. (alterations omitted).
904 F.3d 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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by the patentee because DuPont had taken and planned to take action
that would have implicated the challenged patent.396
Finally, in Knowles Electronics LLC v. Iancu,397 the Federal Circuit
addressed the ability of the PTO to intervene in an appeal to defend
the PTAB’s ruling after the petitioner departs. Patent owner, Knowles
Electronics, appealed from the PTAB’s determination that the claims
challenged in a reexamination were invalid as anticipated or
obvious.398 The third-party requester declined to appear and the PTO
Director intervened “as of right.”399 The majority held that the
Director of the PTO “has an unconditional statutory ‘right to intervene
in an appeal from a [PTAB] decision’” under § 143.400 Judge Newman
dissented, arguing that the PTO does not have authority as intervener
to litigate when there is no appellee or respondent, unless the director
has a concrete and particularized interest such as responding to a
challenge to agency jurisdiction, regulations, or procedures.401 No
such interest existed in this case.402
2.

Privity and real party in interest
The AIA prohibits institution of petitions filed more than one year
after “the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner”
was served with a complaint.403 For five years, the PTAB had the final
say on who was a “real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner.”404
Having expanded its jurisdiction to review PTAB determinations
relating to the one-year statutory bar in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom
Corp.,405 the Federal Circuit finally began reviewing the PTAB’s
statutory interpretation, with mixed results.
The court’s initial reviews affirmed the PTAB’s privity analyses on
the narrow ground that they were responsive to the arguments made

396. Id. at 1004–05.
397. 886 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
398. Id. at 1371–72.
399. Id. at 1379–80.
400. Id. at 1372 n.2. Section 143 provides: “The Director shall have the right to
intervene in an appeal from a decision entered by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
in a derivation proceeding under section 135 or in an inter partes or post-grant review
under chapter 31 or 32.” 35 U.S.C. § 143 (2012).
401. Knowles Elecs., 886 F.3d at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting).
402. Id.
403. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
404. See Achates Reference Publ’g., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 658 (Fed. Cir.
2015), overruled by Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
405. 887 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 826 (2019).
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by the respective patent owners.406 In Wi-Fi One, the petitioner was
alleged to have had an indemnification agreement with a party that
was barred from filing its own petition.407 The PTAB denied discovery
related to the alleged agreement, stating that indemnity payments
would not establish privity or control.408 In WesternGeco LLC v. ION
Geophysical Corp.,409 the appellant was time-barred from filing its own
petition but was able to join a petition filed by its indemnitor under
§ 315(c).410 The patent owner argued that the original petitioner, who
had settled the case before it was decided, was time-barred due to its
relationship to the appellant.411
The appellants in both cases argued that the PTAB applied a
restrictive standard for privity that would require the patent owner to
prove that the petitioner had control over the related district court
proceeding that triggered the § 315(b) bar.412 In both cases, the court
noted that “privy” in § 315(b) carries its common law meaning413 and
is not limited to control,414 which is but one factor that the Supreme
Court has given for a finding of privity.415 But it was not improper for

406. See id. at 1337 (“The Board’s decision to focus on [control in its privity analysis]
was in response to the specific arguments that Wi-Fi raised on the privity issue.”); id. at
1352 n.2 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“The majority justifies its narrow holding on grounds
that . . . Wi-Fi limited its argument to the ‘control over the prior litigation’ ground.”);
see also WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“To the extent the Board analyzed privity based on ION’s control over the PGS
proceedings, it properly did so in response to WesternGeco’s advancement of a theory
focusing primarily on control.”), cert. denied, 2019 WL 659884 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2019).
407. Wi-Fi One, 887 F.3d at 1339.
408. Id. at 1339–40.
409. 889 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
410. See id. at 1314–16.
411. See id. at 1316.
412. Compare id. at 1320 (addressing WesternGeco’s assertion that “the [PTAB]
applied an unduly-restrictive test and focused only on control”), with Wi-Fi One, 887
F.3d at 1336 (“Wi-Fi argues that the [PTAB] improperly required Wi-Fi to satisfy ‘a
hard and absolute requirement that Broadcom must have had the right to control the
District Court Litigation in order to find that a District Court Defendant was a real
party in interest or privy.’”).
413. See WesternGeco, 889 F.3d at 1317; Wi-Fi One, 887 F.3d at 1335.
414. Compare WesternGeco, 889 F.3d at 1320 (“We agree with WesternGeco that
‘control’ is not the exclusive analytical pathway for analyzing privity; as described above,
it is but one of a variety of considerations.”), with Wi-Fi One, 887 F.3d at 1336–37 (“[T]he
[PTAB] recognized that there are a number of circumstances in which privity might be
found, including when the nonparty controlled the district court litigation.”).
415. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008) (outlining a non-exhaustive list
of factors which are alone sufficient to establish party and non-party privity in litigation).
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PTAB to limit its analysis to control where the patent owner had
limited its argument to that factor.416
The decision in Wi-Fi One also had a ripple effect, creating an
opportunity for the Federal Circuit to address the meaning of the term
“real party in interest” in the context of § 315(b).417 In its Trial Practice
Guide, the PTAB noted that “[w]hether a party who is not a named
participant in a given proceeding nonetheless constitutes a ‘real partyin-interest’ or ‘privy’ to that proceeding is a highly fact-dependent
question” that is “handled by the Office on a case-by-case basis.”418 In
practice, the PTAB’s analysis of “real party-in-interest” focused on
assessing whether the extent of funding and control the nonparticipant party exercised in the proceeding. The Federal Circuit in
Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp.419 provided a detailed
discussion for the determination of whether a non-participant is a real
party-in-interest. The Federal Circuit determined that the PTAB
applied an unduly restrictive test for determining whether a person or
entity is a “real party in interest.”420 The court explained that
“[d]etermining whether a non-party is a ‘real party in interest’
demands a flexible approach that takes into account both equitable
and practical considerations, with an eye toward determining whether
the non-party is a clear beneficiary that has a preexisting, established
relationship with the petitioner.”421
The Federal Circuit’s review of the PTO’s statutory interpretation
under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.422 in
Applications in Internet Time provides insight into the contours of “real
party in interest.” Starting with assessing the usage of the term in the
common law context, the court noted that the inclusion of the “real
party in interest” and “privy of the petitioner” in § 315(b) makes clear
that Congress planned for the provision to apply broadly—sweeping in
not only what might be traditionally known as real parties in interest,

416. See WesternGeco, 889 F.3d at 1320; Wi-Fi One, 887 F.3d at 1337–38.
417. Wi-Fi One, 887 F.3d at 1335, 1340.
418. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48759 (Aug.
14, 2012).
419. 897 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
420. Id. at 1339.
421. Id. at 1351.
422. 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (establishing a legal formula for determining
under what circumstances a court should give deference to a government agency in
interpreting the statutes it administers).
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but privies as well.423 The court also noted that the statutory language
bars petitions where proxies or privies would benefit from an instituted
IPR, even where the petitioning party might separately have its own
interest in initiating an IPR.424 The court further looked to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), titled “Real Party in Interest,” which
codified the common law principles for real party in interest.425
Referencing a note to the 1966 Amendment of Rule 17(a) by the
Advisory Committee describing the basis for the real-party-in-interest
rule,426 the Federal Circuit identified two questions: “(1) what ‘right’
is being enforced; and (2) who is ‘entitled’ to enforce that right.”427 In
the context of IPRs, the court determined that the right being
enforced “is a petitioner’s right to seek administrative reexamination
of the patentability of issued claims as an alternative to invalidating
those claims in a judicial proceeding.”428 On the second question, the
court assessed how close the relationship between the real party in
interest and the IPR petitioner must be.429 When it comes to evaluating
this relationship, the common law seeks to ascertain who, from a
“practical and equitable” standpoint, will benefit from the redress that
the chosen tribunal might provide.430 This common law notion applies
with equal force in the IPR context when a patent owner is dragged
into an IPR by a petitioner who necessarily has an interest in canceling
the patent owner’s claims. That patent owner should not be forced to
defend against later judicial or administrative attacks on the same or

423. Applications in Internet Time, 897 F.3d at 1346–47.
424. Id. at 1347.
425. Id. at 1347–48. Rule 17(a) provides that:
[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, and
specifies seven categories of individuals who may sue in their own names
without joining the person for whose benefit the action is brought: (1)
executors; (2) administrators; (3) guardians; (4) bailees; (5) trustees of
express trusts; (6) parties with whom or in whose name a contract has been
made for another’s benefit; and (7) parties authorized by statute.
Id. (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1545 (3d ed. 2018)).
426. Id. at 1348 (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 425, § 1545) (“[T]he modern
function of the rule in its negative aspect is simply to protect the defendant against a
subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to ensure generally
that the judgment will have its proper effect as res judicata.”)).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 1349.
430. Id.
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related grounds by a party that is so closely related to the original
petitioner as to qualify as a real party in interest.431
The Federal Circuit found that nothing suggested Congress
intended for term to have meaning that departs from its common law
origins.432 The legislative history indicates that the terms “real party in
interest” and “privy” were included in § 315 to serve two related purposes:
(1) to ensure that third parties who have sufficiently close relationships
with IPR petitioners would be bound by the IPR estoppel provision; and
(2) to safeguard patent owners from having to defend their patents
against belated administrative attacks by related parties via § 315(b).433
The Federal Circuit then found that the PTAB’s determination that
Salesforce was not a real party in interest under § 315(b) relied on an
impermissibly narrow understanding of the common law meaning of
the term. It also found that the PTAB’s interpretation of the term was
not based on consideration of the entirety of the administrative record,
and seemingly misallocated the burden of proof.434 RPX, unlike a
traditional trade association, is a for-profit company whose clients pay
for its portfolio of “patent risk solutions,”435 which in turn help paying
members “extricate themselves from NPE lawsuits.”436 One of RPX’s
“strategies” for transforming the patent market is “the facilitation of
challenges to patent validity” to “reduce expenses for [RPX’s]
clients.”437 The Federal Circuit determined that the PTAB erred by not
considering these and other facts, which, taken together, imply that
RPX can and does file IPRs to serve its clients’ financial interests, and
also that a key reason clients pay RPX is to benefit from this practice
in the event they are sued by a non-practicing entity (NPE).438 The
court further stressed that RPX bore the burden of persuasion on this
issue.439 The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s decision and
remanded for further proceedings.440

431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

Id. at 1350.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1351–52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1358.
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The Federal Circuit took on burden framework to be used in the
real-party-in-interest analysis in Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc.441 The Federal
Circuit first stressed that the IPR petitioner bears the ultimate burden of
persuasion to show that its petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b)
based on a complaint served on an alleged real party-in-interest more
than a year earlier.442 Turning to the procedure, the court agreed with
the PTAB’s practice of accepting an IPR petitioner’s identification of the
real parties in interest unless and until disputed by a patent owner.443
However, the court disagreed that this acceptance created a rebuttable
presumption that shifted the burden of production to the patent owner
to rebut.444 Instead, the patent owner must “produce some evidence that
tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party
in interest.”445 The court explained that “[a] mere assertion that a third
party is an unnamed real party in interest, without any support for that
assertion, is insufficient to put the issue into dispute.”446
In this case, the Federal Circuit expressed concerns because the
PTAB’s statement that it was unpersuaded “that there is sufficient
evidence that Activision is an unnamed real party in interest for the
reasons given in the Institution Decision” based on patent owner’s
arguments implied that the PTAB assumed the burden of persuasion
rested on patent owner.447 The court was also concerned that the PTAB
may have relied on attorney argument as evidence that Activision was
not controlling or funding these IPRs.448 The Federal Circuit therefore
vacated the final written decisions and remanded the proceeding with
instructions for the PTAB to weigh the evidence in a manner that places
the ultimate burden of persuasion on Bungie, the IPR petitioner, and to
do so in a manner consistent with recent precedent.449
Impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS
The primary transitional issue that the Federal Circuit had to face
was whether it had jurisdiction, after SAS, to address appeals involving

3.

441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

903 F.3d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1243–44.
Id. at 1244.
Id.
Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id. at 1246–48.
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post-grant proceedings with partial institutions.450 The Federal Circuit
decided that issue in the affirmative in PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu.451
The appeal in that case covered final written decisions in three IPRs
and found certain claims of the challenged patent invalid as
anticipated and other claims invalid as obvious.452 The PTAB, however,
did not institute trial on all claims or all grounds set forth in the three
petitions.453
The Federal Circuit considered whether it had
jurisdiction to address the IPR appeals in view of SAS and if so, whether
it may and should decide the appeals and do so without sua sponte
remanding for the PTAB to address the claims and grounds in the
petition excluded by the PTAB in the IPRs.454 The Federal Circuit
concluded that the existence of non-instituted claims and grounds did
not deprive it of jurisdiction to decide the IPR appeals.455 The court
determined that the standard for “final agency action” under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the PTAB’s decision
terminated the IPR proceeding as to all claims and all grounds and the
PTAB made patentability determinations that affect the patent rights
of patentee.456 Although some of what the PTAB did is now seen to be
legally erroneous under SAS, legal error does not mean lack of
finality.457 The Federal Circuit further determined that it need not
reopen the non-instituted claims and grounds because no party sought
SAS-based relief in this case.458
In Nobel Biocare Services AG v. Instradent USA, Inc.,459 the Federal Circuit
concluded that that it had jurisdiction over the appeal of an IPR in which
the PTAB instituted trial on fewer than all challenged claims and
grounds and was not obligated to reopen non-instituted claims or
grounds.460 Because neither party requested a remand for the PTAB to
consider non-instituted claims, the court saw no reason to exercise any
discretion to remand the non-instituted claims or grounds sua sponte.461

450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.

See PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1358–59.
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1361 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012)).
Id. at 1362.
Id.
903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1374.
Id.
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The Federal Circuit, in other cases, granted motions by a party to
remand for the PTAB to consider non-instituted grounds or claims.462
4.

One-year statutory bar
Under Section 315(b), accused infringers must file any IPR petitions
against an asserted patent within one-year of service of a complaint
alleging infringement of that patent.463 In Click-to-Call Technologies, LP
v. Ingenio, Inc.,464 the Federal Circuit addressed the interpretation of
the statutory language “served with a complaint alleging infringement
of a patent.”465 In an en banc footnote, the Federal Circuit reversed the
PTAB’s interpretation, holding that § 315(b)’s time-bar applies “to bar
institution when an IPR petitioner was served with a complaint for
patent infringement more than one year before filing its petition, but
the district court action in which the petitioner was so served was
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.”466
Although the holding is relatively straightforward, the facts of the case
are more complex and involve transfers of ownership, acquisitions, and
name changes. In 2001, the current exclusive licensee of the patent at
issue filed an infringement action against Keen, which subsequently
changed its name to Ingenio, Inc.467 Subsequently, the exclusive
licensee voluntarily dismissed the complaint “without prejudice.”468
Ingenio was then acquired by AT&T which then sold its interest in
Ingenio.469 After Click-to-Call acquired the patent, it filed a patent suit
against Ingenio, which changed its name to YP Interactive LLC.470 In
May 2013, Ingenio with other petitioners filed an IPR petition
challenging the asserted claims, and the PTAB rejected Click-to-Call’s

462. See BioDelivery Scis. Int’l, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc., 898 F.3d 1205,
1207 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (granting opposed motion to remand to consider non-instituted
claims and grounds); Adidas AG v. Nike, Inc., 894 F.3d 1256, 1257–58 (granting
motion to remand to consider non-instituted ground of obviousness where PTAB
determined claims to be non-obvious over the instituted ground).
463. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012) (“An inter partes review may not be instituted if the
petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which
the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint
alleging infringement of the patent.”).
464. 899 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
465. Id. at 1328 (alterations omitted).
466. Id. at 1328 n.3.
467. Id. at 1325.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 1325–26.
470. Id. at 1326.
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contention that the IPR was time-barred by the 2001 complaint against
Keen in its institution decision.471 In its final written decision, the PTAB
affirmed its conclusion that petitioners were not barred from filing an
IPR petition because the initial action was dismissed without prejudice,
which left the parties in the same legal position as if the underlying
complaint had never been served.472
The Federal Circuit reversed the PTAB’s narrow interpretation
finding that the statutory language “unambiguously precludes” the PTAB
from instituting an IPR if the petition is filed more than one year after the
petitioner or real party-in-interest is served with a complaint of patent
infringement.473 The majority found that section 315(b) is agnostic
regarding what events transpired after the defendant was served.474 Judge
Dyk dissented, arguing that the PTAB’s interpretation was correct and
section 315(b)’s time-bar should not apply.475 Several subsequent Federal
Circuit decisions relied on Click-to-Call to dismiss several other IPRs.476
The Click-to-Call decision opens the door to patent owners serving
and subsequently voluntarily dismissing a complaint without prejudice
to “start the clock” running against a defendant. This creates a
strategic dilemma for a defendant who is no longer under imminent
risk of patent litigation but has a limited time window to challenge the
patent at the PTAB.
5.

Tribal sovereign immunity
Last year also presented the Federal Circuit with the opportunity to
address a controversial attempt by Allergan to terminate an IPR
proceeding under the doctrine of tribal immunity by transferring its
patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe. The case, Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.,477 addressed the threshold issue of
471. Id. at 1326–27.
472. Id. at 1327.
473. Id. at 1333.
474. Id. at 1330.
475. Id. at 1350 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
476. See Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc. v. Atlanta Gas Light, Co., 905 F.3d 1311,
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding no distinction between an involuntary and voluntary
dismissal without prejudice, vacating the PTAB’s final written decision, and remanding
for dismissal), petition for cert. filed sub nom., Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Bennett Regulator
Guards, Inc., No. 18-999 (U.S. Jan. 31, 2019); Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Iancu, 899
F.3d 1303, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (vacating the PTAB’s final written decision and
remanding for dismissal of IPR where the petition was filed more than one year after
the complaint was served, but subsequently voluntarily dismissed without prejudice).
477. 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-899 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2019).
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whether tribal sovereign immunity applies to IPR proceedings.478
Mylan, Teva, and Akorn each filed IPR petitions against Allergan’s
Restasis patents.479 The PTAB instituted trial and scheduled a
consolidated oral hearing.480 Before the hearing, Allergan transferred
the Restasis patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.481 The Saint
Regis Mohawk Tribe subsequently moved to terminate the IPR
proceedings arguing that it is entitled to assert tribal sovereign
immunity, and Allergan moved to withdraw from the proceedings.482
The PTAB denied both motions.483 Allergan and the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe appealed.484
The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that tribal sovereign
immunity cannot be asserted in an IPR proceeding.485 Several factors
convinced the court that an IPR proceeding was more like an agency
enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a private party.486 First,
the director possesses broad discretion in deciding whether to institute
review.487 Second, because a petitioner is not required to participate
in a proceeding, the role of the parties suggests that immunity does
not apply.488 Third, the PTO procedures in an IPR do not mirror the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.489 In making its decision, the Federal
Circuit also stressed that it was leaving “for another day” the question of
whether there is any reason to treat state sovereign immunity
differently.490 Judge Dyk wrote separately in concurrence “to describe
in greater detail the history of [IPR] proceedings, history that confirms
that those proceedings are not adjudications between private parties.”491
The Saint Regis decision left open the question of whether state
sovereign immunity still applies in IPR proceedings. To date, the PTAB
has treated state sovereign immunity differently than tribal sovereign
immunity and ruled that state universities were shielded from PTAB
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.

Id. at 1325.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id. at 1328.
Id.
Id. at 1329.
Id. (Dyk, J., concurring).
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challenges under this doctrine. The reasoning in Saint Regis decision
indicates that the Federal Circuit may find that state sovereign
immunity also does not apply in the PTAB.
6.

Motions to amend
In October 2017, the en banc Federal Circuit in Aqua Products, Inc.
v. Matal492 held that under the PTO’s current rules, the PTO may not
place the burden of persuasion regarding the patentability of
proposed amended claims on the patent owner.493 This decision
caused a significant change in PTAB procedure which previously
placed the burden on the patent owner as the moving party to
demonstrate the patentability of the proposed substitute claims.494 In
2018, the Federal Circuit addressed several interim cases in which final
written decisions were issued prior to the en banc decision in Aqua
Products. In these cases, the PTAB vacated the PTAB’s denial of the
motions to amend because they improperly placed the burden on
patent owners to demonstrate patentability and remanded to the
PTAB to reconsider in light of Aqua Products.495
7.

Issue preclusion
MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC496 addressed the application of
Petitioner,
issue preclusion in AIA post-grant proceedings.497
MaxLinear, appealed the PTAB’s final written decision, finding that
the challenged claims were patentable.498 During the pendency of this
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s decision in a separate
IPR proceeding that held the challenged independent claims to be
unpatentable over different prior art grounds.499 The Federal Circuit
held that issue preclusion applied. The fact that the separate IPR
became final while the present case was pending on appeal was
irrelevant.500 The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s finding of
492. 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
493. Id. at 1324–25.
494. Id. at 1300.
495. See id. at 1356–57.
496. 880 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
497. Id. at 1376.
498. Id. at 1374.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 1376 (citing Soverain Software LLC v. Victoria’s Secret Direct Brand
Mgmt., LLC, 778 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[I]ssue preclusion applies even
though the precluding judgment . . . comes into existence while the case as to which
preclusion is sought . . . is on appeal.”).
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patentability and remanded for the PTAB to decide whether the
remaining dependent claims can survive in view of the collateral
estoppel effect of the finding of unpatentability of the independent
claims in the previous IPR.501
In another issue preclusion case, VirnetX Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,502 the
Federal Circuit found that VirnetX was collaterally estopped by the
Federal Circuit’s Rule 36 judgment in a related appeal from
relitigating the question of whether an applied reference was a printed
publication.503 Apple filed two IPR petitions against the challenged
claims.504 Both petitions relied on RFC 2401 in a ground of
unpatentability.505 The PTAB instituted trial in both, and VirnetX filed
patent owner responses arguing that RFC 2401 was not a printed
publication.506
The PTAB disagreed and concluded that the
challenged claims were unpatentable as obvious.507 In a related appeal,
VirnetX appealed seven final written decisions in which the PTAB
found that RFC 2401—in combination with other references—
rendered obvious a number of patents related to the challenged patent
in this case.508 In those cases, VirnetX also argued that RFC 2401 was
not a printed publication.509 The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed
the PTAB’s final written decisions pursuant to Rule 36.510 The Federal
Circuit found that VirnetX was collaterally estopped from relitigating
the question of whether RFC 2401 was a printed publication because
that question was necessary and essential to the judgment in the
related appeal; in fact, it was the only issued raised in that appeal.511
The Federal Circuit applied collateral estoppel sua sponte in XY,
LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C.512 In the underlying district court case,
the jury found the challenged claims neither invalid nor infringed.513
Defendant appealed the district court’s decision, claiming an abuse of

501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.

Id. at 1377–78.
909 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1377.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1378.
890 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1288.
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discretion in determining the invalidity of its claim.514 The asserted
claims were also challenged in an IPR proceeding.515 The PTAB held
that a set of claims (the Freezing Patent claims) were unpatentable,516
and the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s finding of
unpatentability.517 The court’s majority found that the affirmance of
an invalidity finding, whether from a district court or the PTAB, has a
collateral estoppel effect on all pending or co-pending actions.518 The
Federal Circuit therefore did not address the defendant’s invalidity
arguments as to the Freezing Patent claims and dismissed the appeal
of these claims as moot.519 Judge Newman dissented arguing that “due
process is not served by [the majority’s] sua sponte creation of this
estoppel on this appeal, without notice to the parties, without briefing,
and without opportunity to respond.”520
8.

Estoppel
The scope and extent of the estoppel provisions of the AIA statute
remained a hotly debated issued in 2018. The Federal Circuit
addressed one estoppel case in 2018, Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew,
Inc.,521 involving the interplay between statutory disclaimer, adverse
judgment, and patent owner estoppel.522 Prior to institution, the
patent owner, Arthrex, statutorily disclaimed all claims challenged in
the IPR and stated that the filing of the statutory disclaimer was not a
request for an adverse judgment.523 The PTAB however entered an
adverse judgment against Arthrex concluding that 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)
permits the PTAB to construe the statutory disclaimer of all challenged
claims as a request for adverse judgment, even when the statutory
disclaimer occurs before the institution decision.524 As a result of the

514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.

Id. at 1293–94.
Id. at 1294.
Id.
Id. (citing XY, LLC v. ABS Glob., Inc., Appeal No. 16-2228).
Id.
Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1298 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
880 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Id.
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adverse judgment, patent owner estoppel under 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.73(d)(3)(i)525 attached to Arthrex.526
The Federal Circuit first addressed the threshold issue of whether
the adverse final judgment was appealable under 35 U.S.C. § 319527
since the PTAB did not issue a “final written decision.”528 The majority
held that the adverse judgment was appealable because 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295 provides the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction over “an appeal
from a decision of—the Patent Trial and Appeal Board of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office with respect to . . . inter partes
review under title 35” and 35 U.S.C. § 319 “does not cabin” the appeal
rights conferred by § 1295.529
The Federal Circuit was split on the issue of whether the PTAB
properly entered an adverse judgment against Arthrex.530 Rule
§ 42.73(b) provides that “[a] party may request judgment against itself
at any time during a proceeding” and lists four actions that may be
construed by the PTAB as a request for adverse judgment, including
“cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no
remaining claim in the trial.”531 The majority held that the PTAB’s
interpretation is consistent with the rule because “in the trial” can be
interpreted to mean that there is no claim remaining for trial.532 Judge
O’Malley wrote separately to highlight that the PTO’s expansive
definition of “proceeding,” encompassing both the trial and the
preliminary proceeding, and its practice of issuing adverse judgments
prior to institution seem to conflict with the Federal Circuit’s decision
in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc.,533 that “[t]he
IPR does not begin until it is instituted.”534 In dissent, Judge Newman
disagreed with the majority’s interpretation arguing that because all

525. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3)(i) (2018) precludes a patent owner “from taking
action inconsistent with the adverse judgment including obtaining in any patent . . .
[a] claim that is not patentably distinct from a finally refused or canceled claim.”
526. Arthrex, 880 F.3d at 1347.
527. 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012) (“A party dissatisfied with the final written decision of the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board under section 318(a) may appeal the decision pursuant
to sections 141 through 144.”) (emphasis added).
528. Arthrex, 880 F.3d at 1348.
529. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012)).
530. Id. at 1349–51.
531. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) (2018).
532. Arthrex, 880 F.3d at 1350. Rule 42.2 defines “trial” as requiring “a contested
case instituted by the Board based upon a petition.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2.
533. 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
534. Arthrex, 880 F.3d at 1351 (O’Malley, J., concurring).
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challenged claims were disclaimed before the PTAB instituted trial, the
PTAB’s authority to render adverse judgment did not arise.535
9.

Due process and procedural requirements
Arguments that the PTAB violated due process or procedural
requirements536 of the APA continued to take center stage in Federal
Circuit cases in 2018. Many of these cases address the PTAB’s handling
of evidence and arguments, particularly the difficult issue of whether
evidence and argument presented in a petitioner’s reply is
impermissible. In Altaire Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Paragon Bioteck, Inc.,537
the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB violated the APA by refusing
to consider patentee’s expert testimony and test data.538 In May 2015,
Altaire filed a petition for post-grant review of the challenged patent
supported by a declaration of its chief executive, Mr. Al Sawaya.539 In
its patent owner response, Paragon challenged the declaration as not
satisfying the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(b).540 In its reply,
Altaire included a second declaration from Mr. Al Sawaya discussing
his experience and providing additional information regarding how
the testing was performed.541 The PTAB determined that Altaire failed
to timely qualify Mr. Al Sawaya as an expert and that Altaire’s test data
were entitled no weight.542
The Federal Circuit determined that the PTAB abused its discretion
by failing to consider Mr. Al Sawaya’s testimony.543 Because Paragon
challenged Mr. Al Sawaya’s qualifications and knowledge of test results
in its response, it was proper for Altaire to submit a second declaration
responding to the arguments raised in the patent owner response.544

535. Id. at 1355–56 (Newman, J., dissenting).
536. See, e.g., Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’Real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1338–
39 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (rejecting argument that Board violated the APA by changing claim
construction theories midstream without providing parties an opportunity to respond).
537. 889 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
538. Id. at 1284.
539. Id. at 1279.
540. Id. at 1280. Rule 42.65(b) requires a party that relies on a technical test or data from
such a test to “provide an affidavit explaining: (1) [w]hy the test or data is being used; (2) [h]ow
the test was performed and the data was generated; (3) [h]ow the data is used to determine a
value; (4) [h]ow the test is regarded in the relevant art; and (5) [a]ny other information
necessary for the [PTAB] to evaluate the test and data.” Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. 42.65(b) (2018)).
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 1285.
544. Id.
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The Federal Circuit noted that the PTAB could have granted Paragon
a sur-reply, rather than refuse to consider Mr. Al Sawaya’s declaration.545
The Federal Circuit also determined that the PTAB abused its discretion
by refusing to consider evidence regarding the test data and testing
method.546 The Federal Circuit remanded for the PTAB to consider Mr.
Al Sawaya’s declaration and reconsider the test data.547
Next, Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC548 involved the appeal of a remand
determination by the PTAB in an IPR proceeding.549 In the underlying
IPR, the PTAB relied on a new argument and evidence presented by
Dell for the first time at oral argument, without providing Acceleron
an opportunity to respond.550 The PTAB confirmed the validity of a
set of claims and cancelled the remaining claims as either anticipated
or obvious.551 Both parties appealed and the Federal Circuit remanded,
among other reasons, on grounds that the PTAB erred when it failed to
give Acceleron an opportunity to respond.552 On remand, the PTAB
decided to not consider the newly raised “slides” argument during oral
argument due to it being new and non-responsive. The PTAB further
held that the claim presented was not anticipated.553
Dell argued that the PTAB’s failure to consider its argument was
contrary to Federal Circuit precedent and the remand order.554 The
Federal Circuit disagreed and affirmed the PTAB’s decision, finding
that precedent did not compel the PTAB to consider Dell’s new
evidence and “[u]nless it chose to exercise its waiver authority under
37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b), the PTAB was obligated to dismiss Dell’s untimely
argument given that the untimely argument in this case was raised for
the first time during oral argument.”555 Regarding Dell’s second
argument, the Federal Circuit stated that the remand order did not
order PTAB to consider Dell’s new argument and Acceleron’s
response, but set out the requisite procedures that would apply had
the PTAB actually considered Dell’s evidence.556 The Federal Circuit
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.

Id.
Id. at 1286–87.
Id.
884 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1369.
Id.
Id.
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also rejected Dell’s public policy argument holding that due process
and preserving the PTAB’s discretion outweigh any negative effects of
not invalidating a patent claim.557
In Anacor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Iancu,558 the Federal Circuit
addressed APA and due process arguments in the context of post-grant
proceedings. Anacor argued that the PTAB’s final written decision
violated the APA and due process for two reasons: first, the PTAB
adopted a new theory of unpatentability presented in petitioner’s reply
without giving Anacor notice and opportunity to respond; and second,
the petitioner impermissibly relied on new evidence not included in
the petition to satisfy burden of showing prima facie case of
obviousness.559 The Federal Circuit rejected the first argument
because the PTAB based its decision on the same references and
inferences proposed in the petition.”560 The Federal Circuit rejected
the second argument as well, noting that there is “no blanket
prohibition against the introduction of new evidence during an inter
partes review proceeding” and in this case, Anacor had ample notice
and opportunity to respond to the new reference which were properly
offered in reply to arguments made by Anacor and for purpose of
showing state of the art at the time of the patent application.561
In Yeda Research & Development Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.,562 the
Federal Circuit rejected the patent owner’s argument that its due
process rights and the APA were violated because it did not have notice
of, and an opportunity to respond to, a reference introduced for the
first time in the reply declaration of petitioner’s expert.563 Under
Genzyme Therapeutic Products LP v. Biomarin Pharmaceutical Inc.,564 “the
introduction of new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected
in [IPR] trial proceedings and, as long as the opposing party is given
notice of the evidence and an opportunity to respond to it, the
introduction of such evidence is perfectly permissible under the
APA.”565 In Yeda, the patent owner received notice because the
reference was provided with petitioner’s reply, and patent owner

557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.

Id. at 1370.
889 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1379–80.
Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1380, 1382.
906 F.3d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1040.
825 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1366.
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deposed petitioner’s expert, including questioning the expert about
the reference at issue.566 Further, the patent owner could have
addressed the reference at oral argument or sought leave to file a surreply to respond but did not take either action.567 The patent owner
also argued that PTAB erred in considering the reference when
assessing “knowledge, motivations, and expectations of a PHOSITA
regarding the prior art because the reference did not qualify as prior
art.”568 The Federal Circuit disagreed noting that the PTAB has
recognized that non-prior art evidence of what was known “cannot be
applied, independently, as teachings separately combinable” with other
prior art. However, this evidence “can be relied on for their proper
supporting roles, e.g., indicating the level of ordinary skill in the art,
what certain terms would mean to one with ordinary skill in the art, and
how one with ordinary skill in the art would have under-stood a prior art
disclosure.”569 The Federal Circuit therefore found that the PTAB did
not violate the APA or patent owner’s due process rights.570
Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC571 addressed the scope of the
PTAB’s ability to strike arguments included in a petitioner’s reply.572
In its final written decision, the PTAB found that Ericsson had not
proven the challenged claims were unpatentable because the asserted
reference only taught one type of interleaving, interleaving R-blocks
within an S-block as opposed to the interleaving of packets with other
packets within a packet block.573 In reaching its decision, the PTAB
rejected portions of Ericsson’s reply that argued to a person of
ordinary skill in the art, the difference between the disclosed and
claimed interleaving was insubstantial given that interleaving packets
together was known in the art, holding that this was a new theory
beyond the scope of a proper reply.574 The Federal Circuit disagreed,
finding that Ericsson’s arguments “merely expand[ed] on a previously
argued rationale as to why the prior art disclosures are insubstantially
distinct from the challenged claims,” and did not constitute a new

566. Yeda, 906 F.3d at 1040 (pointing to multiple references which gave notice).
567. Id.
568. Id. at 1041.
569. Id. (citing Dominion Dealer Sols., LLC v. AutoAlert, Inc., No. IPR2014-00684,
2014 WL 5035359, at *5 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 6, 2014)).
570. Id. at 1040, 1042.
571. 901 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
572. Id. at 1379–80.
573. Id. at 1378–79 (noting that packets are a specific nomenclature for the ‘831 patent).
574. Id.
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rationale.575 The Federal Circuit further stressed that its decision
“should not be viewed as changing or challenging PTAB’s practice of
limiting the scope of replies pursuant to its regulations.”576
B. Reexamination
Prior to the advent of the AIA post-grant proceedings in September
2012, a party could challenge the validity of certain patents in inter
partes reexamination proceedings. One issue that arises from
reexaminations and other PTO invalidation proceedings is the extent
to which a jury can be made aware of the details of the PTO
proceeding. In 01 Communique Laboratory, Inc. v. Citrix Systems, Inc.,577
the Federal Circuit addressed the use of testimony regarding a
reexamination proceeding during the district court trial.578 The
district court stayed the litigation pending resolution of a request for
inter partes reexamination filed in March 2008 against the asserted
patent by Citrix.579 In October 2013, the PTAB confirmed the
patentability of the asserted claims over various prior art references,580
and the Federal Circuit affirmed.581 The district court denied Citrix’s
motion to exclude evidence pertaining to the PTO reexamination
proceedings and held that the reexamination could be used in a
limited manner at trial, but Citrix could not be identified as the party
that requested the reexamination because “it would be unfairly
prejudicial to Citrix to attribute the reexamination request to Citrix or
to indicate that it was Citrix that advanced certain arguments in the
reexamination process.”582 The district court was concerned that the
jurors might put undue weight on the fact that Citrix advanced
arguments that were rejected by the PTAB, even though the PTAB uses
a different standard and does not have the benefit of the full array of
evidence that would be presented to the jury.583 The Federal Circuit
held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the

575. Id. at 1381.
576. Id. at 1380 (explaining that the Board’s discretion to reject arguments not
raised in before the reply brief).
577. 889 F.3d 735 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
578. Id. at 744.
579. Id. at 738.
580. Id.
581. Id.; see also Citrix Sys., Inc. v. 01 Communique Lab., Inc., 581 F. App’x 900 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (affirming the lower court’s holding).
582. 01 Communique Lab., 889 F.3d at 739.
583. Id.
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PTO reexamination record to be used and not informing the jury
about the Citrix party that requested the reexamination.584
C. Anticipation and Obviousness
Most of the 226 PTAB appeal decisions issued in 2018 dealt with
reviewing the PTAB’s findings on anticipation or obviousness.
Anticipation is a question of fact. Obviousness is a question of law
based on underlying factual findings, including the scope and content
of prior art references and the existence of a reason to combine those
references. The Federal Circuit reviews agency findings of fact for
support by substantial evidence in the agency record, and agency
rulings of law are reviewed for correctness in accordance with law.585
Most of the Federal Circuit’s decisions do not warrant extended
discussion because they dealt with case-specific disputes about
underlying facts. In the majority of these cases, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the PTAB’s decision.586 However, the Federal Circuit did
vacate the PTAB’s decision in a few cases.587 Several PTAB decisions
fell short of the requirement that the PTAB “explicate its factual
conclusions, enabling the [Federal Circuit] to verify readily whether
those conclusions are indeed supported by ‘substantial evidence’
contained within the record.”588
In re Hodges589 was a rare case in which the Federal Circuit reversed
the PTAB, rather than vacating and remanding for further
proceedings.590 During prosecution, the examiner rejected the claims
584. Id. at 744.
585. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
586. See PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding
that substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s finding of motivation to combine);
Anacor Pharm., Inc. v. Iancu, 889 F.3d 1372, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming
obviousness determination because substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s
finding that a PHOSITA would have expected compounds at issue would share
activities, such as inhibition of fungi); Steuben Foods, Inc. v. Nestle USA, Inc., 884 F.3d
1352, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that other factual determinations should be
included); Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(affirming obviousness determination based on Board’s claim construction).
587. See Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc., 884 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (vacating the PTAB’s nonobviousness decision and remanding where claim
construction determined to be erroneous).
588. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1314; see also Power Integrations, Inc. v. Lee, 797 F.3d 1318,
1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the PTAB’s reasoning must be set out “in
sufficient detail to permit meaningful appellate review”).
589. 882 F.3d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
590. Id. at 1109.
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as anticipated by the Rasmussen reference, the Frantz reference, and
as obvious over the combination of Rasmussen and Frantz.591 The
Federal Circuit found that the PTAB’s anticipation determinations
based on Rasmussen and Frantz were unsupported by substantial
evidence and reversed both decisions.592 Regarding Rasmussen, the
court reversed the PTAB’s determination because the only finding
supported by substantial evidence in Rasmussen pertains to the claim
limitation at issue.593 After finding that the PTAB’s construction of
“signal” was unreasonably broad, the court reversed the PTAB’s
determination on the Frantz rejection because the only permissible
factual finding was that Frantz did not disclose a “signal” under an
reasonable construction—a position supported by the PTO’s refusal to
defend the PTAB’s Frantz determination on appeal.594 Finding that
the “obviousness determinations involved ‘potentially lawful but
insufficiently or inappropriately explained’ factual findings,” the
Federal Circuit vacated the obviousness determination and remanded
for further factual findings and explanation.595
Judge Wallach, writing separately, concurred in the decision to
reverse the Frantz and obviousness decisions but dissented with respect
to the Rasmussen decision because “the majority goes too far in
reversing the PTAB’s anticipation finding.”596 The dissent noted that
Federal Circuit precedent has identified two “rare circumstances”597
where the Federal Circuit may reverse the PTAB’s ultimate
patentability determinations: when the PTAB has committed legal
error and no further factual findings are required and when the PTAB
made erroneous factual findings and “only one permissible factual
finding” exists.598 The dissent argued that by departing from the
default rule that deficient agency decisions should be vacated and
remanded, the majority improperly acted as the factfinder.599

591. Id. at 1110–11 (referring to the two patents at issue in the case, the Rasmussen
and the Frantz, which together render all claims obvious).
592. Id. at 1112–13.
593. Id. at 1113–14.
594. Id. at 1115–16.
595. Id. at 1117.
596. Id. at 1117 (Wallach, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
597. Id. at 1118 (citing Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
598. Id. (citing Corning v. Fast Felt Corp., 873 F.3d 896, 903 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
599. In re Hodges, 882 F.3d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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The Federal Circuit addressed the reliance on “ordinary creativity”
or “common sense” during obviousness inquiries in DSS Technology
Management, Inc. v. Apple Inc.600 Noting that common sense and
common knowledge have their proper place in the obviousness inquiry
if explained with sufficient reasoning, the court stressed that “there are
at least three caveats to note in applying ‘common sense’ in an
obviousness analysis.”601 First, common sense is typically invoked to
provide a known motivation to combine, not to supply, a missing claim
limitation; second, common sense is invoked to fill in a missing
limitation only when “the limitation in question was unusually simple
and the technology particularly straightforward”; third, “references to
‘common sense’—whether to supply a motivation to combine or a
missing limitation—cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for
reasoned analysis and evidentiary support, especially when dealing
with a limitation missing from the prior art references specified.”602 In
this case, the Federal Circuit found that the requisite reasoned analysis
and evidentiary support was not present.603 The court then reversed
rather than vacating and remanding because the only proffered
evidence, the testimony of Apple’s expert, was conclusory and
unspecific and the court could not glean a more reasoned explanation
from the record.604 Judge Newman dissented and argued that the
PTAB’s decision was adequately explained, and regardless, the proper
remedy was remand and “not [cementing] this inadequacy into a final
judgment for the opposing party.”605
Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC606 was another case where the
Federal Circuit reversed the PTAB’s invalidity determinations, rather
than vacating and remanding.607 The PTAB ruled that the challenged
independent claim was neither anticipated nor obvious because the
petitioner had “not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that any of claims 1–16” were anticipated or obvious over the
applied prior art reference.608 The PTAB did not separately analyze

600.
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
608.

885 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1374 (citing Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Id.
Id. at 1376–77.
Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1377–78 (Newman, J., dissenting).
890 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1349 (vacating and remanding the remaining claims at issue).
Id. at 1340.
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the challenged dependent claims.609 The Federal Circuit found that
the PTAB’s determinations were not supported by substantial
evidence.610 Specifically, the court held that the testimony of
Intellectual Ventures’ expert’s contradictory statements in the
reference were unsupported opinions and therefore “not substantial
evidence.”611 Judge Wallach dissented and argued that “[t]he majority
improperly steps out of the appellate role and substitutes its own
interpretation of the evidence for the PTAB’s.”612
In Polaris Industries, Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc.,613 the Federal Circuit
vacated the PTAB’s obviousness determination as to a set of claims
because “the PTAB’s analysis of these claims was inadequate.”614 The
court found that the PTAB’s analysis applied an improper framework
to assess patentee’s teaching away argument, specifically improperly
disregarding teachings of a reference as ill-defined “subjective
preferences,” focusing on what a skilled artisan would have been able to
do, rather than what a skilled artisan would have been motivated to do
and encouraging the fact-finder to discard evidence relevant to
teaching-away and motivation to combine.615 On remand, the court
instructed the PTAB to analyze whether the reference teaches away from
the claims “under the framework that our case law has articulated.”616
In re Durance617 also involved an appeal of the examiner’s rejection
during prosecution.618 However, Durance addressed PTO procedure
during examination and appeal. After the examiner issued a final
rejection of the claims as obvious, the applicant appealed the rejection
to the PTAB.619 In the examiner’s answer, the examiner set forth a new
structural-identity argument but did not designate the argument as a
new ground of rejection.620 The applicant challenged the examiner’s
rejections of the structural identity.621 The PTAB affirmed the
609. Id.
610. Id. at 1346.
611. Id.
612. Id. at 1354 (Wallach, J., dissenting) (noting that the proper inquiry considers
whether substantial evidence supported the finding).
613. 882 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
614. Id. at 1067, 1074.
615. Id. at 1068–69.
616. Id. at 1070.
617. 891 F.3d 991 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
618. Id. at 997.
619. Id.
620. Id. at 998.
621. Id. at 999.
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examiner’s obviousness rejection and disregarded applicant’s reply
brief arguments finding that the arguments did not respond to
arguments raised in the answer.622 The Federal Circuit disagreed and
found that if the examiner’s answer included arguments raised for the
first time; an applicant may address those in its reply.623 Here, the
applicant’s reply brief was responsive to the examiner’s answer and
included citations indicating the new arguments to which the
applicant was responding.624 The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s
decision and remanded for the PTAB to consider the arguments made
in the reply brief.625
Secondary considerations were also at issue in several PTAB appeals
decided in 2018. In Polaris Industries, Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc.,626 the
Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s finding of obviousness of a set of
claims because the PTAB improperly rejected its unrebutted evidence
of commercial success.627 The patentee provided evidence that its
product, covered by the claimed invention, was a commercial
success.628 When the patentee shows that the asserted objective
evidence is tied to a specific product and that product “embodies the
claimed features, and is coextensive with them,” the court presumes a
nexus between the commercial success and the claims.629 In this case,
the PTAB refused to give substantial weight to the patentee’s
undisputed evidence because it characterizes the evidence as
conclusory.630 The Federal Circuit instructed the PTAB to assess the
import of patentee’s evidence on remand “after presuming that a
nexus between the claims and the commercial success” of the product
exists, unless and until that presumption is adequately rebutted.631
1.

Printed publication
One ancillary issue that often arises in prior art challenges is whether
the petitioner has adequately established that the asserted reference is
a printed publication. Many of the Federal Circuit’s anticipation and

622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.

Id.
Id. at 1001–02.
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1003 (outlining the arguments the PTAB must address).
882 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1071–73.
Id.
Id. at 1072.
Id. (detailing the evidence that the PTAB refused to fully consider).
Id. at 1073.
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obviousness decisions involving non-patent literature such as catalogs,
conference presentations, and technical reports turned on this issue.
GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding LLC632 addressed the issue of whether
a prior art product catalog was a printed publication.633 In its final
written decision, the PTAB determined that the 2009 GoPro Catalog,
asserted as prior art, did not qualify as a prior art printed publication
and therefore the petitioner failed to establish that the challenged
claims were unpatentable.634 The petitioner provided evidence that
the GoPro Catalog was distributed at the Tucker Rocky annual dealer
trade show, attended by vendors and dealers.635 The PTAB concluded
that petitioner did not establish “that the GoPro Catalog was
disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons
interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art and
exercising reasonable diligence could have located it.”636 Specifically,
a “person ordinarily skilled in the art would not be interested in the
dealer show because it was not an academic conference or camera
industry conference, but rather a dealer show for action sports vehicles
like motorcycles, motorbikes, ATVs, snowmobiles, and watercraft.”637
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that the “case law regarding
accessibility [was] not as narrow as the PTAB interprets it.”638 The
Federal Circuit noted that “the GoPro Catalog was disseminated with
no restrictions and was intended to reach the general public.”639
Because trade shows, like conferences, are “directed to individuals
interested in the commercial and developmental aspects of
products,”640 the Federal Circuit reasoned that “The fact that the
dealer show is focused on action sports vehicles is not preclusive of
persons ordinarily skilled in the art from attending to see what POV
digital cameras were being advertised and displayed.”641 The court
found that, based on the record evidence, the petitioner met the
burden of proving that the GoPro Catalog was a printed publication.642

632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.

908 F.3d 690 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 691.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 694.
Id.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 694.
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Because the PTAB did not consider the merits of the obviousness
claim, the PTAB vacated and remanded.643
The issue of public availability of a catalog was addressed by the
Federal Circuit again in Nobel Biocare Services AG v. Instradent USA, Inc.644
The court noted that “[b]ecause there are many ways in which a
reference may be disseminated to the interested public, ‘public
accessibility’ has been called the touchstone in determining whether a
reference constitutes a ‘printed publication.’”645 To support the public
accessibility of the catalog, petitioner provided the International Trade
Commission testimony of the inventor who testified that he distributed
the catalog at the International Dental Show conference in March
2003 without requiring a confidentiality agreement.646 The petitioner
also submitted two declarations to corroborate the testimony of the
inventor; one of the declarants both received and retained a copy of
the catalog in his files.647 “Corroboration is required of any witness
whose testimony alone is asserted to invalidate a patent, regardless of
his or her level of interest.”648 Sufficiency of corroboration in prior
invention or public use cases is assessed based on a number of factors
including, for example, the relationship between the corroborating
witness and the alleged prior user, the time period between the event
and trial, and the interest of the corroborating witness.649 The Federal
Circuit found that the petitioner’s corroboration was legally sufficient
and rejected the argument that the testimony of one witness cannot be
corroborated by the testimony of another witness.650 The date on the
catalog matched the date the witnesses testified it was publicly
available, and this constituted further corroboration of public
accessibility as of that date.651 The Federal Circuit determined that
substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s finding that the catalog was
publicly accessible prior to the critical date of the challenged patent.652

643. Id. at 695–96.
644. 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
645. Id. at 1375 (quoting In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
646. Id. at 1371–72.
647. Id. at 1372–73, 1376.
648. Id. at 1377–78 (quoting Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (alteration omitted)).
649. Id. at 1378.
650. Id.
651. Id. at 1378–79.
652. Id. at 1376.
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In Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry,653 the Federal Circuit addressed the issue
of whether a video demonstration and slide presentation presented to
spinal surgeons at various industry meetings and conferences were
“printed publications.”654 The PTAB found that the video and slides were
not prior art.655 The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s determination
and found that the PTAB did not fully consider all the relevant factors
such as the size and nature of the meetings, whether the meetings were
open to people interested in the subject matter of the material disclosed,
and whether there was “an expectation of confidentiality between the
distributor and the recipients of the materials.”656
Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals, LLC657 addressed
whether FDA advisory committee “materials were sufficiently accessible
to the public to constitute prior art.”658 The obviousness grounds
presented by petitioner in the six IPR proceedings at issue in this case
relied on four documents, collectively referred to as the Advisory
Committee Art (ACA materials): “(1) the FDA advisory committee
meeting transcript and slides; (2) an FDA preliminary clinical safety
review of Xyrem®; (3) a Xyrem® briefing booklet; and (4) a video and
transcript regarding a proposed distribution system for Xyrem®.”659
The Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the
PTAB’s finding that the ACA materials were publicly accessible.660
First, the notice in the Federal Register, a reference that those of
ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to examine, widely
disseminated the ACA materials through a hyperlink to a public FDA
website where the ACA materials were accessible.661 Second, “the ACA
materials were available online for a substantial time before the critical
date of the patents in suit.”662 Third, “the ACA materials were distributed
via public domain sources with no possible expectation that the materials
would remain confidential or not be copied.”663 The Federal Circuit

653.
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.

891 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id. at 1382–83.
895 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1350–52.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1357–58.
Id. at 1358.
Id.
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further noted “if accessibility is proved, there is no requirement to show
that particular members of the public actually received the information.”664
Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc.665 addressed the public
accessibility of a technical report loaded on the website of a
university.666 The parties did not dispute that the report had been
uploaded to the university’s Computer Science and Engineering
Technical Reports Library’s website prior to the critical date.667 The
dispute focused on whether the technical report was publicly
accessible.668 “‘[P]ublic accessibility’ requires more than technical
accessibility.”669 Because there was no evidence that the report was
disseminated to the public, “the PTAB focused on whether an
interested skilled artisan, using reasonable diligence, would have
found” the report on the Technical Reports Library website.670 “The
website allowed a user to view a list of technical reports indexed only
by author or year.”671 This evidence suggests that an artisan may have
located the report by skimming through potentially hundreds of titles,
most containing unrelated subject matter.672 Because the technical
report was not indexed in a meaningful way and the website’s advanced
search form was deficient, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB did
not err in finding that the report was not publicly accessible and
therefore not a printed publication.673
2.

Priority benefit
The issue of properly claiming priority benefit arises in several
contexts in PTAB proceedings. For example, a petitioner often must
establish benefit to an earlier application to use the prior application’s
filing date to support a proposed ground of unpatentability. Similarly,
a patent owner may attempt to establish priority benefit to an earlier
application to avoid a prior art rejection. A petitioner may also attack
a patent owner’s priority benefit claim in order to use a prior art
reference that pre-dates the patent’s filing date but post-dates the
664. Id. at 1360 (citing Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560,
1569 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (alterations omitted)).
665. 908 F.3d 765 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
666. Id. at 772–74.
667. Id. at 773.
668. Id.
669. Id.
670. Id.
671. Id.
672. Id.
673. Id.
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earlier application. The Federal Circuit addressed a wide range of
priority benefit issues in 2018.
In Droplets, Inc. v. E*TRADE Bank,674 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
PTAB’s finding that the challenged patent was not entitled to the
benefit of a provisional application.675 Regulation 1.78, which
implements the priority benefit statutory provisions of 35 U.S.C.
§ 119(e) and § 120, “requires that an application contain a specific
reference to each prior-filed application to which the application seeks
to claim priority,” including each prior-filed application’s application
number and familial relationship.676 Further, the specific reference
“must be included in an application data sheet . . . or the specification
must contain . . . such reference in the first sentence(s) following the
title.”677 The challenged patent in this case claimed priority benefit to
its immediate parent patent (“the ‘838 patent”) and to a provisional
application (“the ‘917 patent”) which was not co-pending at the time
the challenged patent was filed.678 The ‘838 patent was a continuation
of another patent (“the ‘745 patent”) that properly claimed priority
benefit to the ‘917 provisional application.679 The challenged patent
incorporated the ‘838 patent by reference but did not include an
explicit recitation of the benefit claim from the ‘838 patent to the ‘745
patent. The issue on appeal was whether the challenged patent is
entitled to claim benefit of the ‘917 provisional by virtue of the
incorporation by reference of the ‘838 patent.680 The Federal Circuit
determined that the statutory “specific reference” requirement does
not contemplate incorporation by reference because “[t]o require the
public to search for an unstated priority claim through incorporated
materials would create uncertainty and would require the type of guesswork that the statute is meant to avoid.”681
Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.682 addressed priority benefit in
the context of written description support.683 The challenged patent
claimed priority to a patent cooperation treaty (PCT) application (the

674.
675.
676.
677.
678.
679.
680.
681.
682.
683.

887 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1316 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(3) (2009)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1320.
884 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1358.
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“Emanuel PCT”), which was nearly identical to the specification of the
challenged patent.684 During the inter partes reexamination, the
examiner found that the challenged patent could not claim priority to
the Emanuel PCT because the disclosure in the Emanuel PCT of only
a “fibre optics bundle” did not provide adequate written description
support for the broad genus of “light guides.”685 The examiner then
rejected the claims as obvious over the Emanuel PCT in combination
with a secondary reference.686 The PTAB reversed the examiner’s
rejection and found that the Emanuel PCT provided written
description support for the claimed “light guide.”687 The Federal
Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s finding and held that substantial evidence
supported the PTAB’s finding.688 The parties did not dispute that a
“fibre optics bundle” is a type of light guide and that various types of
light guides were well-known in the art.689 Therefore, from the
intrinsic evidence, a PHOSITA, reviewing the Emanuel PCT, would
have understood the inventor had possession of the claimed light
guide.690 The court also found that “prior patents reflecting the state
of the art at the time of the invention and expert testimony regarding
that evidence support the PTAB’s findings.”691
Natural Alternatives International, Inc. v. Iancu692 addressed priority
claims in a patent family.693 The challenged patent was the eighth
applications in a family of applications directed to increasing athletes’
endurance.694 While the fourth application was pending, the patent
owner filed a provisional application.695 The fifth application in the
family was amended after filing to claim priority only to the provisional
application.696 The sixth through eighth applications issued claimed
priority benefit of the fifth through first applications and the
provisional application.697 The patent owner did not dispute that it
684.
685.
686.
687.
688.
689.
690.
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.

Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1358, 1360.
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1360–61.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1363.
Id.
904 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1377.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1377–78.
Id. at 1378.

2019]

2018 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

1335

waived priority to the fourth through first applications in the fifth
application but argued that the sixth application maintained priority
back to the first application.698 On appeal, the PTAB determined that
when the eighth application was filed, the fifth application was not
entitled to benefit of the fourth application through first applications
and affirmed the examiner’s rejection based on the patent that issued
from the first application.699
The Federal Circuit rejected patent owner’s argument that priority
properly vested by virtue of meeting all the requirements of § 120.700
Noting that the patent owner’s vesting argument conflates properly
claiming priority and demonstrating entitlement to priority, the Federal
Circuit found that the PTAB did not err in its priority determination
because the fifth application lacked priority to the first application, and
the eighth application’s priority claim to the first application (via the
fifth application) did not satisfy all of § 120’s requirements.701
3.

Printed matter doctrine
Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hospital Products IP Ltd.702
expanded the scope of the printed matter doctrine beyond printed
matter to include mental steps.703 The challenged claims in Praxair
“generally require supplying a medical provider with a cylinder of
nitric oxide gas and providing the medical provider with certain
prescribing information relating to the harmful side effects of nitric
oxide for certain patients identified” with left ventricular
dysfunction.704 During claim construction for claims 1–8 and 10, the
PTAB interpreted the provided information, evaluating, and
recommending “claim limitations to be either printed matter or purely
mental steps not entitled to patentable weight” because the “limitations
lacked a functional relationship to the other claim limitations.”705
However, for claim 9, the PTAB interpreted the “in accordance with”
language to mean “based on, or as a result of” and thereby established a
functional relationship to the remaining limitations of the claim.706

698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1379.
Id. at 1381.
890 F.3d 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1031, 1038.
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1030.
Id.
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Patentee, Mallinckrodt, challenged the application of the printed
matter doctrine to claims 1–8 and 10–11.707 The Federal Circuit
applied a two-step framework for printed matter analysis. First, a
determination must be made whether the claim limitation is directed
to printed matter.708 A claim limitation is directed to printed matter if
it claims the content of information.709 Mallinckrodt argued that the
PTAB erred by concluding that claim limitations reciting metal steps
were not entitled to patentable weight.710 The Federal Circuit rejected
this argument finding that “[b]ecause claim limitations directed to
mental steps may attempt to capture informational content, they may
be considered printed matter lacking patentable weight in an
obviousness analysis.”711 Here, the court found that the claims were
directed to printed matter.712 “If a claim limitation is directed to
printed matter, then the next step is to ascertain whether the printed
matter is functionally related to its ‘substrate.’”713 In this case, the
Federal Circuit found that the PTAB did not err in finding that the
recitation of “providing pharmaceutically acceptable nitric oxide gas”
in the preamble did not create a functional relationship between the
printed matter and the remaining claim limitations.714
Judge Newman wrote separately concurring in the judgment but
disagreeing “with the court’s view of the ‘printed matter doctrine’ and
its application to ‘information’ and ‘mental steps.’”715 Judge Newman
argued that unprinted matter or a mental step “does not become
‘printed’ if it carries information, nor even if it requires thinking.”716
Judge Newman also disagreed with the majority’s analysis, which first
applied the “printed matter doctrine” to remove some limitations from
the claim, then reviewed what is left of the claim.717

707.
708.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.

Id. at 1031.
See id. at 1032–33.
Id. at 1031–32 (citing In re DiStefano, 808 F.3d 845, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
Id. at 1033.
Id.
Id. at 1033–34.
Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1038 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1039.
Id. at 1042.
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4.

Swearing behind a reference
In Apator Miitors ApS v. Kamstrup A/S,718 the Federal Circuit
addressed the requirements for swearing behind a reference in a postgrant proceeding. The court noted that an inventor can “swear behind
a reference by proving he conceived his invention” prior to the
reference’s effective filing date in and, after that date, diligently
reduced his invention to practice.719 When a party seeks to prove
conception through an inventor’s testimony, the party must proffer
evidence, “in addition to [the inventor’s] own statements and
documents,” corroborating the inventor’s testimony.720 “Conception
is a question of law predicated on subsidiary factual findings, one of
which is the sufficiency of corroboration.”721
In this case, patentee filed a declaration from the inventor, Mr.
Drachmann, in which he declared he conceived of the invention prior
to the applied reference’s filing date.722 The patentee further filed emails and drawings as independent evidence to corroborate the
inventor’s testimony.723 The PTAB rejected the patentee’s attempt to
swear behind the applied reference and found the challenged claims
unpatentable at final written decision.724 The Federal Circuit affirmed,
finding that substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s finding that
Apator had not established conception prior to the effective filing date
of the applied reference.725 The Federal Circuit noted that the
evidence proffered by patentee “is stuck in a catch-22 of
corroboration” because the e-mails and drawings can only provide the
necessary corroboration with testimony from Mr. Drachman.726 The
court found that Mr. Dachmann’s unwitnessed emails and drawing
were insufficient on their own to corroborate his testimony.727

718. 887 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
719. Id. at 1295 (citing Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc., 841
F.3d 1004, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
720. Id. (citing Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996))
(acknowledging that by requiring corroboration of the testimony, inventors cannot
describe their actions in a self-serving manner).
721. Id.
722. Id. at 1294.
723. Id.
724. Id. at 1295.
725. Id. at 1296.
726. Id.
727. Id. at 1297 (noting the similarity to other circumstances were the court found
that unwitnessed laboratory notebooks were insufficient to corroborate testimony).
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D. Inventorship
In re VerHoef728 involved an appeal of the PTAB affirmance of the
examiner’s rejection of all application claims as unpatentable under 35
U.S.C. § 102(f), which provides that one cannot obtain a valid patent if
“he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.”729
Conception and inventorship are questions of law that the Federal Circuit
reviews de novo, premised on underlying factual findings that the Federal
Circuit reviews for substantial evidence.730 The application at issue was
directed to a dog mobility device.731 The applicant, VerHoef, conceded
that the essential feature of the claims was conceived and suggested by a
veterinarian.732 The Federal Circuit rejected VerHoef’s argument that he
should be declared sole inventor because he maintained “‘intellectual
domination’ and control” of the work.733 The Federal Circuit agreed with
the PTO that the veterinarian was a joint inventor because she
contributed an essential feature of the claimed invention.734
E. Patent Term Adjustment
Actelion Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. v. Matal735 addressed patent term
adjustments under 35 U.S.C. § 154, which accounts for any undue
delays in patent examination caused by the PTO.736 One such delay is
an “A delay,” which arises when the PTO fails to meet statutory
deadlines for events that occur during prosecution, such as providing
notice to the applicant of the rejection of a claim or taking action on
an applicant’s reply to such a rejection.737 The dispute in the appeal
was the PTO’s “A delay” calculation.738
Actelion filed a first PCT application on July 16, 2009 and a second
PCT application on July 15, 2010, claiming priority to the first PCT.739
On January 12, 2012, four days before the thirty month priority date
(January 16, 2012), Actelion filed an application (the ‘619

728.
729.
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.
735.
736.
737.
738.
739.

888 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1363, 1365.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1364.
See id. at 1364–65.
Id. at 1366.
Id.
881 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1340–41.
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1342.
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application). This was a national stage application of the second PCT
application, claiming priority from the July 16, 2009 priority date.740
With the application filing, Actelion filed a preliminary amendment
stating that “[a]pplicant earnestly solicits early examination” but did
not check the box on Form 1390 indicating “an express request to
begin national examination procedures.”741 On April 26, 2013, the
PTO issued a restriction requirement which undisputedly ended the
accrual of “A delay.”742 The PTO later issued an issue notification
providing a grant of forty-one patent term adjustment days.743 Actelion
filed a request for recalculation and in response the PTO reduced the
PTA to forty days.744 Actelion then filed suit against the PTO in the
Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to § 154(b)(4).745
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the PTO.746 The Federal Circuit found that Actelion’s
remark that it “earnestly solicits early examination and allowance of
these claims” was insufficient to communicate to the PTO an “express
request” pursuant to § 371(f) under either the pre- or post-Technical
Corrections Act747 statute.748 The Federal Circuit also found no error
with the PTO’s determination that because January 16, 2012 was a
national holiday, the national stage for the ‘675 patent commenced on
January 17, 2012, the next workday.749
F. Federal Circuit Procedures
The Federal Circuit dismissed a cross-appeal in Droplets, Inc. v.
E*TRADE Bank as improper.750 Both Droplets and E*TRADE argued
740. Id.
741. Id.
742. Id.
743. Id.
744. Id.
745. Id. at 1342–43.
746. Id. at 1346.
747. On January 14, 2013, Congress enacted the Technical Corrections-Leahy
Smith America Invents Act (“Technical Corrections Act”). Pub. L. No. 112-274, 126
Stat. 2456 (2013). The Technical Corrections Act included amendments to provisions
of 35 U.S.C. § 154, covering patent term adjustments. Prior to the amendments under
TCA, § 154(b)(1)(A)(i)(II) read “the date on which an international application
fulfilled the requirements of section 371 of this title” and after amendments read “the
date of commencement of the national stage under section 371 in an international
application.” See 126 Stat. at 2457.
748. Actelion Pharm., 881 F.3d at 1345–46.
749. Id. at 1346.
750. 887 F.3d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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that 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) language that a party who is dissatisfied with
the final written decision of the PTAB may appeal permits a party to
appeal not only the outcome but alternative invalidity grounds.751 The
Federal Circuit disagreed, stressing that it is a well-established rule that
as an appellate tribunal, the Federal Circuit reviews judgments, not
opinions.752 Further, a cross-appeal is only proper when acceptance of
the argument advanced “would result in a reversal or modification of
the judgment rather than an affirmance.”753 In this case, because the
PTAB “entered a judgment of invalidity as to all challenged claims, there
is no basis for a cross-appeal as to additional grounds for invalidity.”754
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp.755 involved the appellate
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.756 The appeal arises solely from a
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.757
monopolization claim under the Sherman758 and Clayton759 Acts
alleging fraud on the PTO.760 The Federal Circuit declined to exercise
jurisdiction and transferred the case to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.761 Because Federal Circuit jurisdiction
extends to cases in which patent law is a necessary element of one of
the well-pleaded claims, the only question for the appeal was “whether
the monopolization allegation ‘necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a
necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims.’”762 The Federal
Circuit found that in this case there was nothing unique to patent law
about the allegations of false statements made to the PTO.763

751. Id. at 1321.
752. Id.
753. Id. at 1322 (quoting TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d
1151, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
754. Id.
755. 882 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
756. Id.
757. 382 U.S. 172, 176–77 (1965) (holding that enforcement of a patent procured
by fraud could be a federal antitrust violation).
758. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-647, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38).
759. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53).
760. Xitronix Corp., 882 F.3d at 1076.
761. Id. at 1075–76.
762. Id. at 1076–77.
763. Id. at 1077.
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In In re Power Integrations, Inc.,764 the Federal Circuit denied the
petitions for a writ of mandamus filed by the petitioner in four denied
IPRs.765 In each proceeding, the PTAB found that none of the applied
references were shown to be prior art and therefore denied
institution.766 Petitioner requested rehearing and the PTAB denied the
request for rehearing, filing a detailed opinion explaining its decision.767
Section 314(d) of Title 35 entitled “No Appeal,” specifies that “[t]he
determination by the Director whether to institute an IPR under this
section shall be final and nonappealable.”768 Faced with this statutory
prohibition on appeal, the petitioner did not directly appeal but sought
to obtain review of the non-institution decision through petitions for
mandamus covering all four of the PTAB’s orders.769 To gain the
remedy of mandamus, the petitioner must show that its right for a writ
of mandamus is “clear and indisputable,” and that there are no
“adequate alternative legal channels” for relief.770 The Federal Circuit
held that mandamus does not lie in this case because the present case
involves no issues extraneous to the application of patent law principles
of unpatentability based on printed publications, nor does it involve any
“shenanigans” on the part of the PTAB that might justify appellate
review or review by mandamus.771 The court however noted that the
decision “is not to say that mandamus will never lie in response to action
by the agency relating to the non-institution of inter partes review.”772
In Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’Real Foods, LLC,773 the Federal
Circuit refused to consider patent owner’s argument, framed as an
alternative basis for affirmance of the PTAB’s decision because patent
owner did not file a cross-appeal.774 In this case, patent owner, f’real,
filed and served a complaint alleging infringement of the challenged
patent in October 2014.775 However, at the time, the patents were
assigned to a holding company (Rich Products Corporation) and not
to f’real; therefore, f’real moved to voluntarily dismiss the complaint
764.
765.
766.
767.
768.
769.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.
775.

899 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1316–17.
Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012)).
Id. at 1319.
Id.
Id. at 1321.
Id.
908 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1336.
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without prejudice.776 In January 2016, f’real, joined with Rich
Products, filed a new complaint asserting infringement of the
challenged patent.777 In May 2016, more than one year after the service
of the first complaint, petitioner filed an IPR petition challenging the
asserted claims.778 The PTAB determined that the petition was not
subject to the one-year bar of § 315(b) because f’real lacked standing
to file the original complaint and therefore the complaint was not a
“proper federal pleading.”779 In view of the Federal Circuit’s decision
in Click-to-Call, f’real argued that the one-year time-bar of § 315(b)
applies, and the PTAB lacked jurisdiction to institute and asked the
Federal Circuit to dismiss the IPR petition.780 The Federal Circuit
refused.781 Although framed as an alternative basis to affirm the
PTAB’s decision, the Federal Circuit determined that f’real’s
argument, if it had merit, would require vacatur of the PTAB’s decision
and a remand for dismissal of the petition.782 Because acceptance of
the argument would require a modification of the PTAB’s decision, a
cross-appeal was required and because f’real did not file a cross-appeal,
the Federal Circuit did not reach the § 315(b) issue.783
G. Attorneys’ Fees and Sanctions
In Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.,784 the Federal
Circuit considered the PTAB’s power to issue sanctions and to accept
late filings.785 Late in the IPR trial, but before the final written decision
was issued, Atlanta Gas’s parent company, AGL Resources Inc., merged
with another company and changed its name.786 Atlanta Gas did not
notify the PTAB of the merger or the name change, and the PTAB did
not know of the changes when it issued its final decision.787 Shortly
after issuance of the final written decision, the patent owner notified
the PTAB of petitioner’s changed corporate parentage and sought

776.
777.
778.
779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.
785.
786.
787.

Id.
Id. at 1336–37.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
905 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1313–14.
Id. at 1314.
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sanctions for petitioner’s nondisclosure.788 Because the merger
created a conflict, one member of the panel recused himself and the
reconstituted panel authorized patent owner to move for the “costs
and fees” it had incurred between the date of the final written decision
and the PTAB’s grant of sanctions.789 At the time of the Federal Circuit
decision, the PTAB had not ruled on the sanction motion.790 Because
the PTAB has not quantified any sanctions, pendent jurisdiction would
be required to decide the challenges to the PTAB’s sanction order.791
The Federal Circuit extends pendent jurisdiction only reluctantly and
only to issues “inextricably intertwined” with or necessary to resolution
of issues already before the court.792 The court declined to exercise
pendent jurisdiction in this case and remanded the issue to the PTAB
to consider its order given the outcome of the appeal.793
Section 145 actions in which the applicant files a civil action against
the Director of the PTO in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia are rare.794 However, in 2018, the Federal
Circuit addressed the issue of whether applicants who invoke § 145 are
required to pay PTO’s attorneys’ fees.795 The Federal Circuit split on
the issue with a strong dissent by Chief Judge Prost combined with the
Fourth Circuit’s position in Shammas v. Focarino,796 Shammas involved
15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3), a trademark analogue to § 145, and with its
split from the majority in Nantkwest, creates the possibility that this
issue could ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court.797

788. Id.
789. Id.
790. Id.
791. Id. at 1315.
792. Id.
793. Id. at 1316.
794. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2012); see also Jeremiah Frueauf et al., Biopharma Patent
Applicants Should Consider a Rarely Used Strategy, STERNE KESSLER (Mar. 18, 2019, 4:01
AM), https://www.sternekessler.com/news-insights/publications/biopharma-patentapplicants-should-consider-rarely-used-strategy.
795. See Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(discussing whether § 145 would allow PTO to collect attorneys’ fees).
796. 784 F.3d 219 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
797. Compare Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1180 (holding that § 145 does not require the
applicant to pay attorneys’ fees), with id. at 1196 (Prost, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
§ 145 requires the applicant to pay all expenses relating to the proceedings, including
the PTO personal expenses), and Shammas, 784 F.3d at 227 (awarding attorneys’ fees
to the PTO under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3)).
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In Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu,798 the en banc court addressed the issue of
whether applicants who invoke § 145 are required by statute to pay “[a]ll
the expenses of the proceedings” incurred by the office in defending
the PTAB’s decision, including the PTO’s attorneys’ fees.799 The
majority of the court determined that it did not because the American
Rule800 prohibits courts from shifting attorneys’ fees from one party to
another absent a “specific and explicit” directive from Congress.801
The Patent Act802 provides two mutually exclusive options for judicial
review of an adverse PTAB decision.803 The applicant may appeal
directly to the Federal Circuit under § 141, or the applicant may file a
civil action against the director of the PTO in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under § 145.804 A § 145
challenge is more expansive involving the possibility of discovery, new
evidence, motions practice, and a trial.805 An applicant proceeding
under § 145 is responsible for his own expenses and fees but also the
PTO’s “expenses of the proceeding.”806 The majority noted that
previously the PTO relied on the “expenses” provision to recover travel
expenses to attend depositions, court reporter fees, and reasonable
fees for expert witnesses but “[f]or more than 170 years, however, the
PTO never sought—and no court ever awarded—attorneys’ fees under
§ 145 or its predecessor.”807
The majority first determined that the American Rule, providing
that “[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose,” applies
to § 145.808 The American Rule serves as the “basic point of reference”
whenever a court “consider[s] the award of attorney’s fees” and may
only be displaced by an express grant from Congress.809 The majority

798. 898 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
799. Id. at 1180.
800. See id. at 1181 (explaining that the American Rule dates back to at least the
jurisprudence of the late 1700s and states that litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees,
regardless of whether they win or lose).
801. Id. at 1180.
802. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
803. See Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1180 (outlining the Patent Act’s procedures for
judicial review).
804. 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145 (2012); Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1180.
805. Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1180.
806. Id.
807. Id. at 1180–81.
808. Id. at 1181, 1184 (quoting Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158,
2164 (2015)).
809. Id. at 1181 (citing Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct at 2164).
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then found that § 145’s statement that “[a]ll the expenses of the
proceedings shall be paid by the applicant” lacks the “specific and
explicit” congressional authorization required to displace the
American Rule.810 The majority reviewed Congress’s usage of the terms
“expenses” and “attorneys’ fees” in other statutes and judicial usage of
statute and concluded that these demonstrated that the ordinary
meaning of “expenses” does not include attorneys’ fees.811
Chief Judge Prost, joined by Judges Dyk, Reyna, and Hughes,
dissented.812 The dissent argued the plain text of § 145 provides the
answer—when it says “[a]ll the expenses of proceeding shall be paid
by the applicant” it means the applicant must pay all the expenses of
the proceeding.813 The dissent noted that the PTO used salaried
government lawyers to assist in defending and therefore these lawyers
incurred expenses because the time they devoted to this case was not
available for other work.814 The dissent concluded that the language
of § 145 evinces Congress’s “specific and explicit” intent to depart from
the American Rule and to impose upon the applicant payment of all the
expenses of the proceeding, including the PTO’s personnel expenses.815
VI. REMEDIES
Both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit took on the issue
of damages in patent infringement cases. In one of the most
significant cases of the year, the Supreme Court ruled in WesternGeco
LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.816 that a patent owner can collect lost
profits based on foreign sales. The Federal Circuit’s damages cases
primarily address the issue of apportionment of damages which is a
central component of every patent damages case.
In FastShip, LLC v. United States,817 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
Court of Federal Claims’s determination of infringement but modified
the damages award.818 FastShip, LLC sued the United States in the
Court of Federal Claims alleging infringement by two of the Navy’s

810.
811.
812.
813.
814.
815.
816.
817.
818.

Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1187–91.
Id. at 1196 (Prost, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1203.
138 S. Ct. 2120 (2018).
892 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1300–01.
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Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS).819
After finding
infringement of the asserted claims, the Court of Federal Claims
determined that one of the accused ships was not “manufactured” for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1498.820 The case turned on the meaning of
“manufactured” in § 1498, which was a matter of first impression.821
The Federal Circuit interpreted “manufactured” in accordance with its
plain meaning, such that a product is “manufactured” when it is made
to include each limitation of the thing invented and is therefore
suitable for use.822 Applying this interpretation, the Federal Circuit
found that the ship was not manufactured prior to the expiration of
the patent.823 The court further agreed with both parties that the
Court of Federal Claims miscalculated the total royalty base and
modified the damages award accordingly.824
A. Apportionment
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc.825 dealt with apportionment of
damages.826 When the accused technology does not make up the whole
of the accused product, the patentee must separate or apportion the
infringer’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the patented
feature and the unpatented features.827 The patentee’s apportionment
evidence “must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or
speculative.”828 Finjan apportioned its damages base to a specific feature
that was the “smallest salable patent-practicing unit” of the infringing
product.829 However, because the feature also contained non-infringing
features, the Federal Circuit found that additional apportionment was

819. Id. at 1300.
820. Id. at 1302–03. Section 1498(a) provides that “[w]henever an invention
described in and covered by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured by
or for the United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or
manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States
in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and
entire compensation for such use and manufacture.” 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012).
821. Fastship, 892 F.3d at 1303.
822. Id. at 1306.
823. Id.
824. Id. at 1310.
825. 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
826. Id. at 1302.
827. Id. at 1310.
828. Id. (quoting Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884)).
829. Id.
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still required.830 The Federal Circuit also found that Finjan’s royalty rate
was unsupported by substantial evidence.831 Despite finding that “Finjan
failed to present a damages case that can support the jury’s verdict,” the
Federal Circuit remanded to the district court to determine whether
Finjan waived the right to establish a reasonable royalty under a new
theory and whether to order a new trial on damages.832
In Exmark Manufacturing Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Products Group,
LLC,833 the Federal Circuit vacated the jury’s damages award and
remanded for a new trial on damages.834 Briggs & Stratton Power
Products Group argued that the damages expert should have
apportioned or separated the value of the improvement from the other
features of the mower through the royalty base rather than the royalty
rate.835 The Federal Circuit disagreed noting that apportionment can
be addressed in a variety of ways, including “by careful selection of the
royalty base to reflect the value added by the patented feature [or] . . .
by adjustment of the royalty rate so as to discount the value of a product’s
non-patented features; or by a combination thereof.”836 Here, using the
accused mower sales as a royalty base, an apportioning through the
royalty rate is an acceptable methodology provided that patent owner
adequately and reliably apportions between the improved and
conventional features of the accused mower.837 The Federal Circuit
found that the expert opinion of the patent owner’s damages expert was
inadmissible because it failed to adequately tie the expert’s proposed
royalty rate to the facts of the case and concluded that the district court
abused its discretion in denying patent owner’s motion for a new trial
on damages.838 The Federal Circuit further determined that “the district
court abused its discretion by holding that prior art is relevant to
damages only to the extent that the prior art was commercialized.”839
In Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc.,840
the Federal Circuit addressed the entire market value rule.841 In this
830.
831.
832.
833.
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.
839.
840.
841.

Id.
Id. at 1311–12.
Id. at 1312.
879 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
Id. (citing Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
Id.
Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1352.
894 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1262.
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case, the damages verdict rested on Power Integrations’ reliance on the
entire market value rule, which “allows for the recovery of damages
based on the value of an entire apparatus containing several features,
when the feature patented constitutes the basis for consumer
demand.”842 “If the product has other valuable features that also
contribute to driving consumer—demand, patented or unpatented—
then the damages for patent infringement must be apportioned to
reflect only the value of the patented feature.”843 The Federal Circuit
found that the evidence presented by Power Integrations was insufficient
as a matter of law to invoke the entire market value rule, vacated the jury
award of $139.8 million in damages, and remanded for a new trial.844
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s determination of the
ongoing royalty rate in XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C.845 After a
jury found defendant willfully infringed the asserted patents and that
the asserted patents were not invalid, patent owner filed a motion
seeking an award of an ongoing royalty as an equitable remedy for
defendant’s future infringement.846 Noting that defendant admitted
that it intended to continue to practice the asserted patents, the district
court determined an ongoing royalty would be appropriate.847 The
district court observed that the jury effectively adopted the fifteen
royalty rate on gross sales and the four percent royalty rate for reverse
sorting services proposed by patent owner’s damages expert at trial,
and “every one of XY’s prior licenses include[d] a [ten percent] royalty
rate, which tend[ed] to prove that [ten percent] [was] XY’s established
royalty.”848 Based on these observations, the district court calculated
an ongoing royalty rate for gross sales by averaging the jury’s 15%
percent rate with the 10% rate in the prior licenses to arrive at 12.5%
and calculated for services by taking half of the 4% royalty rate.849 The
Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court, which focused on preverdict factors “that were either irrelevant or less relevant than postverdict factors” such as prior agreements between the parties.850 The

842. Id. at 1270 (quoting Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2009)).
843. Id. at 1271.
844. Id. at 1273.
845. 890 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
846. Id. at 1288–89.
847. Id. at 1289.
848. Id.
849. Id.
850. Id. at 1297.
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court found that the district court’s focus should have been on patent
owner’s improved bargaining position and any other changed economic
factors rather than patent owner’s past acts.851 The Federal Circuit
remanded for the district court to recalculate the ongoing royalty rate.852
B. Enhanced Damages
Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, a “court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed.” In Halo Electronics, Inc. v.
Pulse Electronics, Inc.,853 the Supreme Court described § 284 “as
providing that ‘punitive or increased damages’ could be recovered ‘in
a case of willful or bad-faith infringement.’”854 However, a finding of
willful infringement does not require the district court to award
enhanced damages.855 In Polara Engineering Inc. v. Campbell Co.,856 the
Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s decision to award enhanced
damages because the district court did not adequately explain its basis
for doing so.857 Applying the factors listed in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,858
the district court determined that five of the nine Read factors favored
an award of enhanced damages, two of the factors weighed against
enhancement, and two of the factors were neutral.859 The Federal
Circuit determined that the district court’s observation that
“obviousness was a close call” and that the “other invalidity theories
were weaker” was insufficient to determine why the district court
viewed the closeness of the Read factor as neutral.860 The Federal
Circuit remanded instructing “the district court to provide a more
complete explanation, including a discussion of the public use
defense, in exercising its discretion. We express no view on whether
damages should be enhanced or, if so, by what amount.”861

851. Id. at 1298.
852. Id.
853. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
854. Id. at 1930. The Federal Circuit remanded in Exmark Manufacturing Co. v.
Briggs & Stratton Power Products Group, LLC because the district court’s decision that
excluded evidence did not comport with the standard articulated in Halo. Exmark, 879
F.3d 1332, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
855. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933.
856. 894 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
857. Id. at 1355–56.
858. 970 F.2d 816, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
859. Polara, 894 F.3d at 1347.
860. Id. at 1355.
861. Id. at 1356.
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C. Attorneys’ Fees—Exceptional Cases
Raniere v. Microsoft Corp.862 dealt with the contours of exceptional case
requirements.863 Raniere sued Microsoft and AT&T for patent
infringement and asserted five patents against AT&T and two against
Microsoft.864 Raniere assigned all rights in the patents to Global
Technologies, Inc. (GTI), and later Raniere executed a document on
behalf to GTI that purportedly transferred the asserted patents from
GTI to himself.865 Microsoft moved to dismiss the suit for lack of
standing.866 After discovery on the issue of standing and a hearing, the
district court concluded that Raniere was unlikely to be able to cure
the standing defect and dismissed the case with prejudice.867 The
Federal Circuit affirmed.868 While the merits appeal was pending,
Microsoft and AT&T filed a motion seeking attorney fees and costs
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285.869
In exceptional cases, a district court may award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party.870 An exceptional case is “simply one that
stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a
party’s litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner in which the
case was litigated.”871 The Federal Circuit rejected Raniere’s argument
that a dismissal with prejudice, without adjudication of a patent
infringement claim, precludes a finding that a defendant has
prevailed.872 First, the court noted that under the Supreme Court’s
holding in CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission,873 “a defendant need not obtain a favorable judgment on
the merits in order to be a ‘prevailing party.’”874 Other circuits have
interpreted CRST to mean that, if a defendant prevails on a
jurisdictional issue, it may be a prevailing party.875 Second, the court
862. 887 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
863. Id. at 1303.
864. Id. at 1300.
865. Id.
866. Id.
867. Id.
868. Id.
869. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
870. Id.
871. Raniere, 887 F.3d at 1303 (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct 1749, 1756 (2014)).
872. Id.
873. 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1651 (2016).
874. Raniere, 887 F.3d at 1304.
875. Id. at 1305–06, 1306 n.1 (discussing varying approaches among the circuits).
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found that even without the benefit of CRST, defendant was a
prevailing party because the district court dismissed Raniere’s
infringement suit “with prejudice,” which was tantamount to a decision
on the merits.876 The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that the case was exceptional based on Raniere’s behavior
throughout the litigation employing “a pattern of obfuscation and bad
faith” which caused the defendants to incur significant fees and costs
to oppose Raniere’s positions.877
The Federal Circuit in In re Rembrandt Technologies LP Patent
Litigation878 affirmed the district court’s exceptional case
determination but vacated the fee award.879 The court deemed the
case exception for three reasons: (1) Rembrandt improperly
compensated its fact witnesses; (2) Rembrandt engaged in (or failed to
prevent) widespread document spoliation over a number of years; and
(3) Rembrandt should have known that the asserted patents that were
revived after abandonment were unenforceable.880 After noting that
the “district court’s remarkably terse orders shed little light on its
justifications for its decisions on these fact-intensive issues,” the Federal
Circuit could not say that any of the district court’s findings were based
“on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment
of the evidence.”881 Regarding the fee award, the Federal Circuit held
that the district court failed to establish a “causal connection” between
the misconduct and the fee award.882 The Federal Circuit vacated the
fee award and remanded for the district court to determine how much
of the claimed fee award Rembrandt should pay based on the
misconduct associated with the exceptional case determination.883
In Energy Heating, LLC. v Heat On-the-Fly, LLC,884 the Federal Circuit
vacated the district court’s denial of motions for attorneys’ fees under
§ 285 and remanded for further proceedings on the issue.885 After
finding inequitable conduct, the district court declined to award fees
stating that the patentee “reasonably disputed facts with its own

876.
877.
878.
879.
880.
881.
882.
883.
884.
885.

Id. at 1307.
Id. at 1308.
899 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1260–61.
Id. at 1265.
Id. at 1266–67.
Id. at 1280.
Id.
889 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1306.
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evidence and provided a meritorious argument against a finding of
inequitable conduct.”886 However, the court noted that under
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,887 inequitable conduct
requires a specific intent to deceive, and “to meet the clear and
convincing evidence standard, the specific intent to deceive must be
‘the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the
evidence.’”888 Because the district court’s reasoning contradicted
Therasense, the Federal Circuit was unsure whether the court’s basis for
denial rested on a misunderstanding of the law or an erroneous fact
finding and remanded to the district court for reconsideration.889
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the
accused infringer’s motion for attorney fees in Stone Basket Innovations,
LLC v. Cook Medical LLC.890 After plaintiff filed its infringement case,
the accused infringer filed an IPR petition challenging all claims of the
asserted patent.891 The PTAB instituted trial, and the patent owner
subsequently requested an adverse judgment.892 After the PTAB
granted adverse judgment, the patent owner moved to dismiss the
patent litigation with prejudice.893 The district court determined that
the case was not exceptional and found that the record did not
demonstrate that patent owner “willfully ignored the prior art or failed
to evaluate its case” or that patent owner’s “actions were . . . objectively
unreasonable in light of the circumstances.”894 The Federal Circuit
rejected the accused infringers’ argument that its invalidity
contentions placed patent owner on clear notice of the asserted
patent’s invalidity because the contentions were based on prior art
considered by the examiner with no further explanation.895 The
inventor’s deposition testimony regarding the novelty of a single claim
element also did not make the case exceptional because invalidity is
established by considering the patent claim as a whole.896 Finally, the
Federal Circuit found that the district court was within its discretion to

886.
887.
888.
889.
890.
891.
892.
893.
894.
895.
896.

Id. at 1307.
649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Energy Heating, 889 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1290).
Id. at 1308.
892 F.3d 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1177–78.
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1178–79.
Id. at 1179–80.
Id. at 1180.
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factor in the accused infringer’s litigation conduct because conduct of
the parties is a relevant factor under the totality-of-the-circumstances
inquiry in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.897 Here, the
accused infringer failed to inform patent owner that it believed it was
being subjected to exceptional litigation behavior or demand that the
case be dismissed.898
D. Double Recovery
Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. v. Renesas Electronics America,
Inc.899 dealt with the issue of double recovery.900 At trial, the jury found
the defendant liable for trade secret misappropriation and patent
infringement.901 The Federal Circuit vacated the patent infringement
damages, holding that the patent award represented an impermissible
double recovery because although the jury awarded only a portion of
the proposed patent royalty, the patent award covered sales that were
part of the trade secret misappropriation disgorgement award.902
E. Injunction
To obtain a permanent injunction, a party succeeding on the merits
of patent infringement, must show (1) irreparable injury in the
absence of an injunction, (2) inadequacy of compensatory remedies at
law, (3) a balance of hardships favoring an injunction, and (4)
consistency of an injunction with the public interest.903
Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions904 dealt with the first element
from eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC.905 The district court found that
Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions (TAOS) had not shown
irreparable harm because TAOS requested a reasonable royalty as
compensation for past infringement and a reasonable royalty should
be adequate to compensate TAOS for future infringement.906 The
court found that a request for relief in the form of a reasonable royalty
may be relevant to the irreparable harm and inadequacy of
897.
898.
899.
900.
901.
902.
903.
904.
905.
906.

Stone Basket, 892 F.3d at 1181.
Id.
895 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1328.
Id.
Id.
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
Tex. Adv. Optoelectronic Sols., 895 F.3d at 1331.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
Tex. Adv. Optoelectronic Sols., 895 F.3d at 1331.
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compensation elements of eBay but it does not mean there do not exist
the kinds of hard-to-measure harms that can justify injunctions to
prevent them before they occur.907 The Federal Circuit therefore
vacated the district court’s denial of an injunction and remanded for
further consideration of the request.908
MACOM Technology Solutions Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies
AG909 was another 2018 case involving injunctions. Nitronex
(predecessor to MACOM) obtained several patents related to gallium
nitride (GaN) which it later sold to Infineon’s predecessor
(International Rectifier Corporation).910 As part of the sale, the parties
executed a license agreement defining a “Field of Use” characterized
by GaN-on-silicon technology and licensing MACOM to practice the
patents within the “Field of Use only.”911 Infineon notified MACOM
that it believe MACOM breached the agreement by making and selling
GaN-on-silicon-carbide technology and subsequently terminated the
agreement.912 MACOM sued Infineon asserting contract claims, a
claim for declaratory judgment of non-infringement of the licensed
patents, and a declaratory judgment that the agreement was wrongly
terminated and remains in effect (wrongful termination claim).913
MACOM also moved for a preliminary injunction based on the
wrongful termination claim.914 The district court granted the
preliminary injunction invalidating the termination of the agreement,
barring Infineon from designing, developing, making, using offering
to sell, selling or servicing products in the exclusive field that practice
the licensed patents, and prohibiting Infineon from granting licenses
or sublicenses to the licensed patents.915
To obtain a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit, a party must
show that: (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) it is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the
balance of equities tips in its favor, and (4) an injunction is in the

907.
908.
909.
910.
911.
912.
913.
914.
915.

Id.
Id. at 1332.
881 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1326.
Id.
Id. at 1326–27.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id.
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public interest.916 The Federal Circuit rejected Infineon’s argument
that the district court erred in finding that MACOM showed a
likelihood of success on its wrongful termination claim because
Infineon’s termination of the agreement was not wrongful.917 The
Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not err in finding
that MACOM could likely establish that its activity outside the
agreement’s licensed Field of Use did not breach the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.918 The Federal Circuit also rejected
Infineon’s second argument that the district court erred in finding that
MACOM was likely to suffer irreparable harm.919 The Federal Circuit
determined that the district court did not rely only on Infineon’s
marketing in finding irreparable harm; it also relied on the
commercial benefits of the agreement’s exclusivity.920 The Federal
Circuit then concluded “that a sufficient causal nexus exists between
Infineon’s termination of the Agreement and this harm to MACOM
that the district court identified.”921 Infineon also challenged the
content of the injunction.922 The Federal Circuit vacated the first
sentence which enjoined Infineon from undertaking certain activities
concerning products in the exclusive field because it lacked the
specificity required by Rule 65(d).923 The court found that the
injunction prohibited infringing acts—but without reference to any
particular, adjudicated infringing product.924 The Federal Circuit also
vacated the second sentence which enjoined Infineon from granting
particular licenses or sublicenses because it ordered specific
performance of a provision without a showing of a breach.925

916. Id. at 1328 (citing Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th
Cir. 2017)).
917. Id.
918. Id. at 1329.
919. Id. at 1330–31.
920. Id.
921. Id. at 1331.
922. Id.
923. Id. Rule 65(d) mandates that every order granting an injunction must “state
the reasons why it issued,” “state its terms specifically,” and “describe in reasonable
detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts
restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1).
924. MACOM Tech. Sols., 881 F.3d at 1332.
925. Id. at 1332–33.
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VII. DISTRICT COURT
A. Procedural
01 Communique Laboratory, Inc. v. Citrix Systems, Inc.926 affirmed the
district court’s denial of patentee’s, 01 Communique Lab, motion for
a new trial.927 On appeal, Communique argued that it was “entitled to
a new trial on the issues of infringement and damages because Citrix
resorted to ‘a well-known defendant’s trick,’ known as the ‘practicing
the prior art defense.’”928 The Federal Circuit agreed that there is no
“‘practicing the prior art’ defense to literal infringement”929 but noted
that a litigant is not precluded from arguing that if a claim term must
be broadly interpreted to read on an accused device, then this broad
construction will read on the prior art.930 The Federal Circuit further
noted that “when an accused product and the prior art are closely
aligned, it takes exceptional linguistic dexterity to simultaneously
establish infringement and evade invalidity.”931 That was exactly the
problem faced by Communique in this case. The Federal Circuit found
that the arguments by Citrix did not rest on an improper “practicing the
prior art” defense but instead correctly recognized that claim terms must
be construed the same way for both invalidity and infringement.932 The
court further rejected the argument that Citrix’s comparisons were
“devastatingly prejudicial to the integrity of the trial” because the jury
instructions made “abundantly clear” that in assessing infringement the
jury was not to compare the accused product to the prior art.933
In SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC,934 the Federal Circuit vacated the
district court’s order dismissing SimpleAir’s complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) as barred by issue preclusion and the Kessler935 doctrine.936
SimpleAir initiated a series of patent infringement lawsuits asserting one
or more patents from a family of patents against Google over a six-year
926. 889 F.3d 735 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
927. Id. at 744.
928. Id. at 740–41.
929. Id. at 742.
930. Id.
931. Id. at 742–43.
932. Id. at 743.
933. Id. at 743–44.
934. 884 F.3d 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
935. Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285, 288–90 (1907) (holding that a patent holder is
barred from bringing an infringement action against a customer of a seller who, prior
to the sale, prevailed on an action for infringement on the same patent).
936. SimpleAir, 884 F.3d at 1162–63.
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period.937 The asserted patents are children linked to the same parent
by continuation applications, and therefore, share a common
specification with the parent.938 During prosecution of the asserted
patents, SimpleAir filed terminal disclaimers over the parent
application to overcome an obviousness-type double patenting
rejection.939 To date, the litigations have resulted in three judgments
of non-infringement in Google’s favor.940
In this case, SimpleAir’s fourth infringement case, the district court
held that the present case and the previous cases involved the same
claim or cause of action. The Court reasoned that the asserted patents
shared the same title and specification with the previously adjudicated
patents and that the filing of a terminal disclaimer to overcome the
PTO’s obviousness-type double patenting rejections indicated that the
PTO believed the content of the patents in suit to be patentably
indistinct from the earlier patents.941 Notably, the district court never
compared the claims of the asserted patents with the claims of the
previously adjudicated patents.942
The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred by presuming
that a terminally disclaimed continuation patent presents the same
cause of action as a parent patent based on the filing of the terminal
disclaimer alone.943 Although a terminal disclaimer is a strong clue
that the claims in a continuation lacked a patentable distinction over
the parent, that strong clue does not give rise to the presumption that
a patent subject to a terminal disclaimer is patentably indistinct from
its parent patent.944 The court further noted that its cases “foreclose
the inference that filing a terminal disclaimer functions as an
admission regarding the patentability of the resulting claims.”945 The

937. Id. at 1163.
938. Id.
939. Id.
940. Id.
941. Id. at 1164.
942. Id.
943. Id. at 1169.
944. Id. at 1168.
945. Id. at 1167 (citing Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 1376,
1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“A terminal disclaimer is simply not an admission that a laterfiled invention is obvious.”); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 941 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (rejecting argument that patent applicant admitted to obviousness-type double
patenting by filing terminal disclaimer); Quad Envtl. Techs. Corp. v. Union Sanitary
Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he filing of a terminal disclaimer simply
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court vacated the district court’s order and remanded to the district
court to determine whether the asserted claims are patentably distinct
from the previously adjudicated claims.946
B. Pleading Standard
In Disc Disease Solutions, Inc. v. VGH Solutions, Inc.947 and Nalco Co. v.
Chem-Mod, LLC,948 the Federal Circuit addressed the pleading standard
for patent infringement claims.949 In Disc Disease, the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to state a claim.950 The plaintiff filed a complaint
alleging patent infringement that specifically identified the accused
products and alleged the products meet “each and every element of at
least one claim” of the asserted patents, “either literally or
equivalently.”951 The following day, amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure took effect, abrogating Rule 84 and Form 18.952 The
district court subsequently granted defendants motion to dismiss the
complaint finding that the complaint did not satisfy the Iqbal and
Twombly953 plausibility standard.954 The Federal Circuit disagreed
holding that plaintiff’s allegations provided the defendant fair notice
of infringement of the asserted patents and therefore were sufficient
under the plausibility standard of Iqbal and Twombly.955
In Nalco, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of
Nalco’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim for direct
infringement, indirect infringement, and infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.956 Regarding direct infringement, the court
found that defendant’s arguments “boil[ed] down to objections to
Nalco’s proposed claim construction for ‘flue gas’” based on alleged
admissions made during an inter partes reexamination which was a

serves the statutory function of removing the rejection of double patenting, and raises
neither presumption nor estoppel on the merits of the rejection.”)).
946. Id. at 1171.
947. 888 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
948. 883 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
949. Disc Disease, 888 F.3d at 1260; Nalco, 883 F.3d at 1350.
950. Disc Disease, 888 F.3d at 1260.
951. Id. at 1258.
952. Id.
953. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007).
954. Disc Disease, 888 F.3d at 1258–59.
955. Id. at 1260.
956. Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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dispute not suitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss.957
Regarding indirect infringement, the court concluded that the
complaint alleged facts that plausibly showed that defendants
specifically intended their customers to infringe and that defendants
knew the customers’ action constitute infringement.958 Regarding
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the court found that
Nalco’s claim adequately stated a claim for infringement by explicitly
incorporating the detailed infringement contentions explaining its
doctrine of equivalents claim.959
C. Motion to Amend Complaint
In Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,960 the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Aatrix’s motion for leave
to file a second amended complaint.961 “A district court should freely
give leave to amend a complaint ‘when justice so requires,’”962 but may
deny a motion to amend on numerous grounds such as “undue delay,
undue prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the amendment.”963
Noting that the district court “gave no reason for its denial of Aatrix’s
motion to amend,” the Federal Circuit found that the proposed second
amended complaint contained allegations that, taken as true, would
have directly affected the district court’s patent eligibility analysis.964
Specifically, the proposed amended complaint alleged facts directed
to inventive concepts in the claimed invention and would be useful for
Alice/Mayo step two that requires consideration of whether the claims
contain an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the claimed
abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.965
D. Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction
In AbbVie Inc. v. MedImmune Ltd.,966 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of a declaratory-judgment action.967 The

957.
958.
959.
960.
961.
962.
963.
964.
965.
966.
967.

Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1354.
882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1123.
Id. at 1126 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)).
Id. (quoting Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013)).
Id.
Id. at 1126–27 (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014)).
881 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1335.
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declaratory judgment action concerned a 1995 development and licensing
agreement entered into by predecessors to AbbVie and MedImmune,
licensing AbbVie to practice the challenged patent and requiring AbbVie
to pay royalties on sales of certain antibodies “until the last to expire of
[certain] Patents or the expiry of fifteen years from the date of first
commercial sale of a product by [AbbVie’s predecessor) . . . (whichever is
later).”968 AbbVie brought the declaratory-judgment action seeking only a
declaration that the challenged claim is invalid.969 AbbVie contended that
a declaration of the patent’s invalidity would constitute its expiration for
purposes of the 1995 agreement and cause its royalty obligations to expire
in January 2018.970 The district court dismissed the complaint on two
alternative grounds: first, because AbbVie does not practice the challenged
patent, it is in not at risk of an infringement suit, and second, deciding the
invalidity question would not resolve the parties’ ultimate dispute.971
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s first ground
for dismissal holding that a contractual dispute, if properly presented,
could be the subject of a declaratory judgment action regardless of
whether a party was at risk of an infringement suit.972 However, AbbVie
did not seek a declaration of its contractual obligations, only a
declaration of invalidity that would not resolve the parties’ contractual
dispute.973 The agreement between the parties was governed by British
law and it is an open question whether the British courts would
consider the invalidation of a patent to be tantamount to its expiration
for purposes of the agreement.974 Without resolution to this question,
the contractual dispute would persist.975 Because “a litigant may not
use a declaratory judgment action to obtain piecemeal adjudication of
defenses that would not finally and conclusively resolve the underlying
controversy,” the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s second
ground for dismissal.976

968. Id.
969. Id.
970. Id.
971. Id. at 1336.
972. Id. at 1336–37.
973. Id. at 1337.
974. Id. at 1338.
975. Id.
976. Id. at 1337–38 (quoting MedImmune Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127
n.7 (2007).
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AIDS Healthcare Foundation, Inc. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.977 also dealt
with a declaratory judgment action.978 AIDS Healthcare Foundation
provides medical care to persons afflicted with AIDS, including
providing antiviral drugs such as the tenofovir alafenamide fumarate
(“TAF”) products that Healthcare buys from defendants.979
Healthcare sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity of five patents
“to clear out the invalid patents” so it “would have the ability then to
partner with generic makers and purchase TAF as soon as it could
become available on expiration of the five-year New Chemical
exclusivity set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).”980 Notably, no
potential generic producer had filed an ANDA for any TAF-containing
products at the initiation of this action, for TAF’s new chemical entity
period of exclusivity foreclosed such a filing until November 2019.981
The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of a
case or controversy in terms of the Declaratory Judgment Act.982 The
Federal Circuit affirmed.
A plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment bears the burden of
demonstrating that a case or actual controversy existed at the time the
declaratory action was filed.983 That requires a showing of injury-infact, connection between the challenged conduct and the injury, and
redressability by the requested remedy.984 “The foundation of a
declaratory action is that the facts alleged, under all the circumstances,
show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant
the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”985 Here, the Federal Circuit
found that plaintiff had not met the immediacy and reality
requirement because there was no present infringement, no threat of
or possibility of infringement litigation, and no meaningful
preparation to infringe.986 The court also rejected Healthcare’s
argument that its actions created liability for inducing infringement

977. 890 F.3d 986 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
978. Id. at 989.
979. Id.
980. Id.
981. Id. at 992.
982. Id. at 990.
983. Id.
984. Id. at 990–91 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1998)).
985. Id. at 991 (quoting MedImmune Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127
(2007); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
986. Id.
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because there was no direct infringement.987 The Federal Circuit also
found that an adverse economic interest is not itself an adverse legal
interest, and the absence of a covenant not to sue infringers did not
create a justiciable case or controversy.988 Regarding Healthcare’s
argument that public policy is served by invalidation of invalid patents,
the Federal Circuit noted that “the Hatch-Waxman Act is already a
balance of several policy interests, seeking to preserve the patent
incentive to invent new drugs, while enabling validity challenge by
ANDA filers before actual infringement occurs.”989
E. Personal Jurisdiction and Venue
The Federal Circuit addressed three petitions for writ of mandamus
on the issue of venue under the patent venue statue.990 In re HTC
Corp.991 addressed where foreign companies can be sued for patent
infringement.992 HTC Corp. petitioned for writ of mandamus
directing the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware to vacate
its order denying-in-part HTC’s motion to dismiss for improper venue
and dismiss the complaint.993 HTC Corp. is a Taiwanese corporation
with its principal place of business in Taiwan, and its wholly owned U.S.
based subsidiary, HTC America, is a Washington corporation with its
principal place of business in Seattle, Washington.994 The Delaware
district court found that venue was not proper as to HTC America but
was proper as to HTC Corp.995 Following the order, plaintiffs
voluntarily dismissed their suit against HTC America without
prejudice.996 HTC Corp. filed a mandamus petition seeking dismissal
for improper venue.997
“A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in
extraordinary circumstances.”998 “The following conditions must be
met for the court to issue a writ: (1) the petitioner must have no other

987.
988.
989.
990.
991.
992.
993.
994.
995.
996.
997.
998.

Id. at 992–93.
Id. at 993–94.
Id. at 995.
28 U.S.C. § 1400.
889 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1351–52.
Id. at 1352.
Id.
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adequate means to attain the relief desired; (2) the petitioner must
demonstrate a “clear and indisputable” right to the issuance of the writ;
and (3) “even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing
court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is
appropriate under the circumstances.”‘999 The Federal Circuit found
that the first condition was not met because “unlike a defendant
challenging the denial of a § 1404(a) transfer motion, a defendant
aggrieved by the denial of an improper venue motion has an adequate
remedy on appeal from a final judgment.”1000 Specifically, if after
judgment venue is determined to have been improper, and the improper
venue objection was not waived, HTC Corp. “will be entitled to assert it
on appeal and, if the objection is sustained, obtain from [the appeals]
court an order vacating the judgment . . . and directing the remand of the
action to the [appropriate venue].”1001 The court explained that “[g]iven
the availability of adequate relief on appeal, mandamus review of
improper venue decisions is generally inappropriate.”1002
The Federal Circuit also held that HTC Corp. failed to demonstrate
the second condition: that its right to a writ was clear and
indisputable.1003 Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Brunette
Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc.,1004 the Federal Circuit
reaffirmed the “long-established rule that suits against aliens are wholly
outside the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and
special.”1005 The court explained its belief that Congress did not intend
the 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)1006 to “upend the
centuries-old understanding that the venue laws (as opposed to
requirements of personal jurisdiction) do not restrict the location of
suits against alien defendants.”1007 The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and
Venue Clarification Act of 2011 made only one minor change to the
alien-venue rule, limited to venue protection to alien natural persons
999. Id. (citing Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004)).
1000. Id. at 1352–53.
1001. Id. at 1353 (quoting Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Leahy, 193 F.2d 302, 304–05
(3d Cir. 1951)).
1002. Id.
1003. Id. at 1354.
1004. 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
1005. In re HTC, 889 F.3d at 1354 (quoting Brunette, 406 U.S. at 714).
1006. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (2012) (“[A] defendant not resident in the United
States may be sued in any judicial district, and the joinder of such a defendant shall be
disregarded in determining where the action may be brought with respect to other
defendants.”).
1007. HTC, 889 F.3d at 1356.
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having permanent resident status.1008 The Federal Circuit rejected
HTC Corp.’s argument that Brunette creates a “loophole” for a plaintiff
to forum shop, noting that HTC Corporation’s interpretation creates
“a far more unsatisfactory loophole—a complete inability for a patent
owner to bring its infringement claims against alien defendants that
fall outside the non-residence-based clause of § 1400(b).”1009
The Federal Circuit clarified the issue of where a domestic
corporation “resides” under § 1400 when its state of incorporation has
more than one judicial district in In re BigCommerce, Inc.1010 Plaintiffs,
Diem and Express Mobile, each filed patent infringement suits against
BigCommerce in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.1011
BigCommerce is incorporated in the state of Texas and is registered
and headquartered in Austin, Texas, which is in the Western District
of Texas.1012 It was undisputed that BigCommerce had no place of
business in the Eastern District of Texas.1013 BigCommerce moved to
dismiss the Diem case and transfer the Express Mobile case, arguing that
under the Supreme Court’s decisions in TC Heartland1014 and Stonite
Products,1015 it resides only in the Western District of Texas.1016 In both
cases, the district court held that “a domestic corporation resides in
the state of its incorporation and if that state contains more than one
judicial district, the corporate defendant resides in each such judicial
district for venue purposes.”1017 BigCommerce petitioned for a writ of
mandamus in both cases.1018
The Federal Circuit found that mandamus was warranted because
different district courts have come to different conclusions about
whether a corporation “resides” under § 1400(b)1019 in every judicial
1008. Id. at 1359.
1009. Id. at 1360–61.
1010. 890 F.3d 978 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
1011. Id. at 980.
1012. Id.
1013. Id.
1014. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1521
(2017) (reaffirming that a domestic defendant corporation “resides” under § 1400(b)
only in its state of incorporation).
1015. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942).
1016. In re BigCommerce, 890 F.3d at 980.
1017. Id. (quoting Diem LLC v. BigCommerce, Inc., No. 6:17-cv-00186, 2017 WL
3187473, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2017)).
1018. Id.
1019. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (“Any civil action for patent infringement may be
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”).
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district within its state of incorporation when the state has more than
one judicial district.1020 After considering the plain meaning and
legislative history of § 1400(b), the Federal Circuit held that
for purposes of determining venue under § 1400(b) in a state having
multiple judicial districts, a corporate defendant shall be considered
to ‘reside’ only in the single judicial district within that state where
it maintains a principal place of business, or, failing that, the judicial
district in which its registered office is located.1021

The Federal Circuit determined that in this case venue is proper under
the resides prong of § 1400(b) only in the Western District of Texas.1022
In In re ZTE (USA) Inc.,1023 the Federal Circuit granted ZTE’s petition
for a writ of mandamus, vacated the order denying ZTE’s motion to
dismiss, and remanded for reconsideration.1024 The Federal Circuit
found that the case presented two basic and undecided issues relating
to proper judicial administration: whether Federal Circuit or regional
circuit law governs the burden of proof for determining the propriety
of venue under § 1400(b), and on which party the burden rests.1025 On
the first issue, the Federal Circuit held that Federal Circuit law governs
the placement of the burden of persuasion on the propriety of venue
under § 1400(b).1026 On the second issue, the Federal Circuit held as
a matter of Federal Circuit law that, upon motion by the defendant
challenging venue in a patent case, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing proper venue.1027 Because the district court incorrectly
assigned the burden of proof on venue to ZTE and failed to fully
consider all relevant factors, the court vacated the order denying the
motion and remanded for reconsideration.1028
M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. Dynamic Air Ltda.1029 addressed personal
jurisdiction over a foreign entity.1030 Patent owner sued defendant in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging
infringement of five patents.1031 Dynamic Air Ltda. (DAL) is a foreign
1020.
1021.
1022.
1023.
1024.
1025.
1026.
1027.
1028.
1029.
1030.
1031.

BigCommerce, 890 F.3d at 981.
Id. at 986.
Id.
890 F.3d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1011.
Id. at 1013.
Id.
Id. at 1010.
890 F.3d 995 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 998.
Id.
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entity organized under the laws of Brazil with a principal place of
business in Brazil.1032 DAL is a subsidiary of Dynamic Air Inc. which is
a Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in
Minnesota.1033 Between October 2011 and January 2012, the Brazilian
state-owned oil company Petroleo Brasilerio S.A. (Petrobas) requested
bids for installation of systems on ships, and DAL subsequently won the
bid.1034 DAL installed the allegedly infringing system on PTAB two U.S.
flagged ships.1035 The district court dismissed the case for lack of
personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), finding that although the
alleged infringing activities took place on U.S.-flagged ships that are
themselves U.S. territory, the contract between Petrobras and DAL did
not identify the ships on which DAL would be required to make
installations.1036 Therefore, DAL did not purposefully avail itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the United States because its
contacts were exclusively due to the unilateral activity of Petrobras.1037
Reviewing the issue de novo1038 under Federal Circuit precedent, the
Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and
remanded for further proceedings.1039 The sole issue on appeal was
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over DAL comports with
due process.1040 After finding that DAL’s activities were purposefully
directed at the United States and the claim of patent infringement
arose out of those contacts, the burden shifted to DAL to present a
compelling case that the presence of some other consideration would
render jurisdiction unreasonable.1041 In assessing whether exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant would be reasonable and fair,
the Federal Circuit considers five due process factors: (1) the burden

1032. Id.
1033. Id.
1034. Id.
1035. Id. at 998–99.
1036. Id. at 999.
1037. Id.
1038. Personal jurisdictional issues in patent infringement cases are reviewed de
novo and under Federal Circuit precedent. See Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr.
Ind. Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1292–93 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1039. M-I Drilling Fluids, 890 F.3d at 1003.
1040. Id. at 1000 (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, [the defendant must] have certain minimum contacts with
[the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945))).
1041. Id. at 1001–02.

2019]

2018 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

1367

on the defendant; (2) the forum’s interest in adjudicating the dispute;
(3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;
(4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the
states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.1042
Because the exclusive licensee of the asserted patents, and therefore
one of the allegedly injured parties is a U.S. domiciliary, the Federal
Circuit determined that it has a paramount interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief in a U.S. court.1043 Because the
exclusive licensee is a U.S. plaintiff trying to enforce its U.S. patents for
alleged infringing activity in a U.S. territory, the court found that the
first three factors strongly favor exercising specific personal jurisdiction
over DAL.1044 Regarding the final two factors, concerned “with the
potential clash of substantive social policies between competing fora and
the efficiency of a resolution to the controversy,” the forum here is the
entire United States so no competing forum is available and the court
had “no reason to believe that the [f]ederal [g]overnment’s interest in
its foreign relations policies with Brazil will be hindered by allowing the
district court to exercise personal jurisdiction” over DAL.1045 Judge
Reyna wrote in concurrence providing additional reasoning why the
exercise of personal jurisdiction here does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.1046
F. Standing
Advanced Video Technologies LLC v. HTC Corp.1047 affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s infringement complaints for lack of
standing because plaintiff did not have full ownership of the asserted
patent.1048 The sole issue in the appeal was whether a co-inventor of
the patent transferred her ownership interests in the patent under the
terms of an employment agreement.1049 The Federal Circuit analyzed
whether any of three provisions of the employment agreement

1042.
1043.
1044.
1045.
1046.
1047.
1048.
1049.

Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1002–03 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1003 (Reyna, J., concurring).
879 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1319.
Id. at 1315–16.
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effected a transfer of ownership rights from the co-inventor: a “will
assign” provision, a trust provision, and a quitclaim provision.1050
The “will assign” provision provided that the co-inventor “will assign
to the Company” all her right, title, and interest in any inventions.1051
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the “will assign”
language “invoked a promise to do something in the future and did
not effect a present assignment” and did not create an immediate
assignment of the co-inventor’s rights.1052 The trust provision provided
that the co-inventor “will hold in trust for the sole right and benefit of
the Company.”1053 The Federal Circuit found that even if the coinventor’s interests in the invention were immediately placed in trust,
“it does not follow that those interests were automatically, or ever,
actually transferred out of trust in favor of [the company].”1054 Because
under California trust law, a trust beneficiary “generally is not the real
party in interest,” “may not sue in the name of the trust,” and “has no
legal title or ownership interest in the trust assets,”1055 the plaintiff
cannot maintain a patent infringement suit where the co-inventor is
not a party nor can she be involuntarily joined as a plaintiff in the
pending suit.1056 Finally, the “quitclaim assignment” providing that the
co-inventor “waive and quitclaim to the Company any and all claims”
served to waive the co-inventor’s rights to interests in any patent rights
that she assigned under the agreement.1057 Because no patent rights were
ever assigned, the Federal Circuit found that the quitclaim provision did
not affect an assignment of the patent from the co-inventor.1058
Judge O’Malley concurred because binding precedent “compels the
result.”1059 However, Judge O’Malley wrote separately to express her
belief that the binding precedent “that a non-consenting co-owner or
co-inventor can never be involuntarily joined in an infringement
action pursuant to Rule 19 of the Federal Circuit Rules of Civil
Procedure is incorrect.”1060 Judge Newman dissented because the
1050. Id. at 1317.
1051. Id.
1052. Id. at 1317–18.
1053. Id. at 1317.
1054. Id. at 1318.
1055. Id. (quoting Saks v. Damon Raike & Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 869, 874–75 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992).
1056. Id.
1057. Id. at 1318–19.
1058. Id. at 1319.
1059. Id. (O’Malley, J., concurring).
1060. Id.
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employment agreement “placed ownership of the employee’s
inventions with the employer” and therefore the co-inventor had no
ownership interest in the asserted patent.1061
James v. j2 Cloud Services, LLC1062 addressed standing in the
correction-of-inventorship context.1063 Plaintiff filed a correction-ofinventorship claim alleging that he is the sole inventor of a patent that
lists two different individuals as inventors.1064 The patent was originally
assigned to JFAX, the company owned by the listed inventors, and
subsequently assigned to Advanced Messaging Technologies, Inc.
(AMT).1065 The defendant in this case, j2, has an exclusive license to
the patent.1066 At the time of the invention, the plaintiff worked for
GSP Software, which entered into a contract with JFAX to develop
software to provide fax-to-email, email-to-fax, and voicemail-to-email
functionalities.1067 The plaintiff admitted that he assigned all
copyrights in code and compiled software to JFAX but denied
assigning any patent ownership or inventorship rights.1068 The district
court dismissed the case finding that the plaintiff lacked Article III
standing because he “fail[ed] to allege facts sufficient to show that he
has an ownership or financial interest in the . . . patent.”1069 The
Federal Circuit disagreed and reversed.
The Federal Circuit concluded that if the plaintiff were to prevail on
his allegations that he was the sole inventor and that sole inventorship
entails sole ownership, he would have stood to gain concretely.1070
Such gain would be directly related to the merits of the claim and would
redress the injury of being deprived of allegedly rightful ownership
which, absent other facts, would be sufficient to give plaintiff Article III
standing.1071 The case therefore turned on whether the plaintiff
assigned his patent rights to JFAX under either the software
development agreement or by the “hired-to-invent doctrine.”1072 The
1061. Id. at 1326 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1062. 887 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
1063. Id. at 1370.
1064. Id.
1065. Id.
1066. Id.
1067. Id. at 1370–71.
1068. Id. at 1371.
1069. Id. (citing James v. j2 Cloud Servs. Inc., No. 2:16-cv-05769, 2016 WL 9450470,
at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2016)).
1070. Id. at 1372.
1071. Id.
1072. Id. at 1373.
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Federal Circuit found that the software development agreement was
amenable to the construction that it does not assign, or promise to
assign, patent rights that would otherwise accrue to the plaintiff as an
inventor.1073 At the present stage of the litigation, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the agreement must be construed in plaintiff’s favor and
therefore does not deprive plaintiff of constitutional standing.1074 The
court also determined that the “hired-to-invent” rule, recognizing that an
employer may “claim an employee’s inventive work where the employer
specifically hires or directs the employee to exercise inventive faculties,”
was inapplicable.1075 Unlike prior cases applying the rule, the agreement
for engagement of services in this case was between two artificial legal
entities, and the inventor was not personally a party to either.1076
G. Jury Instructions
Flexuspine, Inc. v. Globus Medical, Inc.1077 involved the impact of the
jury’s failure to heed a “stop instruction” in the jury verdict form.1078
In Flexuspine, the verdict form instructed the jury to address the
questions of invalidity and damages only if they made an affirmative
finding of infringement.1079 However, after finding no infringement,
the jury indicated that the claims were also found invalid and wrote “0”
for the damages amount.1080 After the district court instructed the jury
to re-execute the verdict form consistent with the instructions therein,
the jury found the claims not to be infringed and left the questions of
invalidity and damages unanswered.1081 The district court dismissed
the defendant’s Rule 59(e) motion requesting that the judgment be
amended to include the jury’s invalidity verdict as well as the
defendant’s invalidity counterclaims, rendering the Rule 50(b) motion
for judgment as a matter of law on invalidity moot.1082
The Federal Circuit rejected defendant’s contention that the district
court was not authorized to direct the jury to further consider its

1073. Id. at 1374.
1074. Id. at 1375.
1075. Id. at 1375–76 (quoting Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403,
407 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
1076. Id.
1077. 879 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
1078. Id. at 1371–72.
1079. Id. at 1371.
1080. Id. at 1372.
1081. Id.
1082. Id. at 1372–73.
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answers and verdict because the “jury’s answers to the validity and
damages questions ‘had to conflict’ with the jury’s answer of no
infringement” because the verdict form predicated the answers to
those questions on an affirmative response to the infringement
question.1083 The Federal Circuit also rejected the defendant’s
argument that the district court’s dismissal of its invalidity
counterclaims violated defendant’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury
claim.1084 Because defendant failed to object to the verdict form, the
issue of invalidity was submitted to the jury as an affirmative defense,
not a counterclaim.1085 Therefore, the district court did not deprive
defendant of its right to a jury trial outright, “it merely declined to
submit its counterclaims to this jury.”1086 Finally, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Rule 50(b) claim, finding
that a “district court judge faced with an invalidity counterclaim
challenging a patent that it concludes was not infringed may either
rehear the claim or dismiss it without prejudice.”1087
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit resolved many cases in 2018
that significantly impacted the practice of patent law. The next year
will bring further clarity from the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
on the issues ranging from Article III standing, IPR real party in
interest, on-sale bar, and fair, reasonable, and on-discriminatory
royalties for standards-essential patents. And as always, we expect the
Federal Circuit and PTO to provide more guidance on the contours
§ 101 in 2019.

1083. Id. at 1373–74 (quoting White v. Grinfas, 809 F.2d 1157, 1161 (5th Cir. 1987)).
1084. Id. at 1375.
1085. Id.
1086. Id.
1087. Id. at 1376 (citing Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 355 F.3d 1361, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).

